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THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER: AN 
EXAMINATION OF STUDENT FREE SPEECH 
RIGHTS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
 
Allison N. Sweeney* 
 
ABSTRACT 
The boundaries of the schoolyard were once clearly delineated 
by the physical grounds of the school. In those days, it was 
relatively easy to determine what sort of student behavior fell 
within an educator’s purview, and what lay beyond the school’s 
control. Technological developments have all but erased these 
confines and extended the boundaries of the school environment 
somewhat infinitely, as the internet and social media allow 
students to interact seemingly everywhere and at all times. As 
these physical boundaries of the schoolyard have disappeared, so 
too has the certainty with which an educator might supervise a 
student’s behavior. 
Because smartphones, tablets, and computers abound, the ways 
in which students are able to communicate have changed 
dramatically in the new millennium, but the law governing the free 
speech rights of students in American public schools has not kept 
pace. Current law allows educators to punish student speakers 
when their in-school speech disrupts the school environment, or is 
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likely to do so—but it is not clear that this same standard should 
apply to student speech that is posted online away from school, or 
whether a school should be able to punish off-campus online 
student speech at all. Because the Supreme Court of the United 
States has not yet spoken on the issue, and in the absence of a 
better standard, the courts that have addressed the issue of 
problematic off-campus online student speech have applied this 
standard that bases a school’s ability to punish the speaker on the 
(potential) disruptiveness of his or her speech. 
This Note explores that which the First Amendment guarantees 
to adult citizens and the ways in which these guarantees differ for 
public school students in school, as governed by four major 
Supreme Court decisions in the past fifty years. This Note then 
examines the recent cases in which courts have applied this 
precedent to off-campus online student speech for which the 
speakers were punished by their schools, and analyzes the ways in 
which the application of the same standard in these cases has led 
to drastically different outcomes. Ultimately, this Note contends 
that educators must be able to supervise student online activities to 
some extent, and proposes a new standard by which a public 
school would be able to punish a student for his or her off-campus 
online speech only if that speech was actually of concern to the 
school, and if that speech interfered with the rights of others in the 
school community.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the internet and its associated technologies has 
changed American life in countless ways. It has entirely reshaped 
how we interact and communicate, which is evident perhaps 
nowhere more clearly than in American high schools. The internet 
is a tool, but as with any such helpful device, problems arise when 
it is mishandled. As parents and educators attempt to teach 
362          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:359 
 
children responsible ways to relate to the world around them, they 
are navigating the uncharted waters of the digital age, which can be 
particularly tricky in a society that so values its freedom of speech. 
The internet has changed the teenage social landscape, and adults 
are still learning to recognize when it is necessary to intervene, and 
how best to do so. 
A recent tragedy highlights many of the facets of the debate 
over whether schools should be able to regulate student speech that 
is posted online away from campus. On February 14, 2018, 
Nikolas Cruz entered his former high school in Parkland, 
Florida1—from which he had been expelled2—and fired more than 
one hundred bullets from his semiautomatic rifle3 in six minutes.4 
He is accused of murdering seventeen students and employees of 
Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in that time.5 Only adding 
to the terrible circumstances of these horrific events is that 
someone with the username ‘Nikolas Cruz’  had posted an eerie 
message in the comments of a YouTube6 video only five months 
earlier: “I’m going to be a professional school shooter.”7 Though 
 
1 Patricia Mazzei & Alan Blinder, Parkland 911 Calls Are Released: ‘Someone’s 
Shooting Up the School,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/08/us/florida-school-shooting-911-calls.html 
[https://perma.cc/LYU7-RVAD]. 
2 Brianna Sacks, This Is What We Know About Nikolas Cruz, The Florida High 
School Shooting Suspect, BUZZFEED (Feb. 16, 2018, 4:44 PM),  
https://www.buzzfeed.com/briannasacks/florida-school-shooting-
suspect?utm_term=.xkZYG0KlyD#.obNyaOBrN4 [https://perma.cc/4GQP-KHKM]. 
3 Audra D.S. Burch, Frances Robles & Patricia Mazzei, Florida Agency Investigated 
Nikolas Cruz After Violent Social Media Posts, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/17/us/nikolas-cruz-florida-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/5WFR-KSMM]. 
4 Mazzei & Blinder, supra note 1. 
5 Id. 
6 YouTube is a video site where one “goes to watch user-generated videos.” Diana 
Graber & Cynthia Lieberman, A CyberWise Guide to 10 Apps Teens Love, CYBERWISE, 
http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/f6bccd_69e0700c50ee46f4ae6747069e2270d1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5ESX-KB46] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). YouTube “is now the second 
largest search engine after Google (who also owns it). Min[imum] age of use [is] 18. 
Those from 13-17 must have a parent or guardian’s permission to sign up.” Id. 
7 Therese Apel, ‘Nikolas Cruz’ YouTube Comment Brings FBI to Bail Bondsman’s 
Door, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018, 1:35 PM), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/news/nation-now/2018/02/15/florida-school-shooting-nikolas-cruz-youtube-
comment-bail-bondsman/341236002/ [https://perma.cc/BAC4-MPHD]. 
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the owner of the video reported this to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigations at the time, there was little evidence for detectives to 
use in their investigation, as “there was no particular information 
about the particular time, location, or further identifiers about the 
person who posted the comment.”8 Assuming this comment was in 
fact posted by the same Nikolas Cruz indicted for the murders in 
Parkland,9 his high school likely could have acted on such speech 
had the school known about it while he was still a student there, 
despite the fact that he posted it online away from campus.10 
At present, off-campus online student speech is generally 
punishable if it is reasonably forecast to cause or actually does 
cause a substantial disruption of the school environment.11 Though 
courts do not necessarily agree about what sort of speech is 
foreseeably or actually disruptive on the whole,12 threatening 
speech is generally considered disruptive, and therefore 
punishable.13 Not all violent speech is necessarily threatening, but 
if a school became aware of this same post from one of its 
students, it seems reasonable to interpret the post as a threat 
directed towards the speaker’s classmates, and subsequently, it 
would be reasonable to punish the speaker. Notwithstanding a 
 
8 Adam Goldman & Patricia Mazzei, YouTube Comment Seen as Early Warning in 
Shooting Left Little for F.B.I. to Investigate, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/15/us/politics/nikolas-cruz-youtube-comment-fbi.html 
[https://perma.cc/692Q-C44S]. 
9 Alan Blinder, Florida Will Seek Execution of Nikolas Cruz in Parkland Shooting 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/13/us/nikolas-
cruz-death-penalty.html [https://perma.cc/6J6P-UAXM]. 
10 See generally infra Section II.C.1.a (discussing standards governing school 
punishment of violent/threatening off-campus online student speech). 
11 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016); see also infra Part II (discussing the current standard governing 
off-campus online student speech). This Note analyzes the First Amendment rights of 
American public school students only, as the rights of private school students, or students 
in public universities are not necessarily the same as those of public school students. Any 
discussion of “schools,” “school officials,” or “students” in this Note refers to public 
schools, their students, and faculty unless otherwise noted. 
12 See generally infra Part II. 
13 This is true of threatening speech in general, as well as threatening speech analyzed 
under the Tinker standard in a school setting. See infra Section II.C.1.a (discussing 
standards governing school punishment of violent/threatening off-campus online student 
speech). 
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general right to free speech in the United States, this is exactly the 
sort of speech that a school must be able to regulate, not only to 
maintain order in its classrooms, but also to protect its students 
from imminent danger.14 
Had the school identified and acted on this comment, seventeen 
lives might have been saved.  Unfortunately, this tragedy was not 
prevented and many of the young survivors have since become 
staunch advocates for stricter gun control.15 Imagine a student who 
survived a school shooting such as this posting to her Facebook 
page from home a month after the carnage, encouraging her 
classmates to walk out of class in organized protest to advocate for 
gun control reform.  Inciting her classmates to act in this way is 
likely foreseeably disruptive of the school environment,16 and 
therefore likely subjects the speaker to punishment at school. Ours 
is a society in which a post expressing the speaker’s desire to 
orchestrate a “professional” school shooting17 is punishable on the 
same level as a post advocating for peaceful protest and political 
change. It is unfathomable that a student attempting to peacefully 
change a world with which she disagrees faces the same risk of 
school discipline as another student threatening to murder his 
classmates. Though a school must have some ability to maintain 
order in its halls, students, too, must have some right to speak,18 for 
as student participants in the Civil Rights Movement, Vietnam War 
 
14 See infra Section III.A. 
15 See Maggie Astor, ‘Let Us Have a Childhood’: On the Road with the Parkland 
Activists, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/15/us/politics/parkland-students-voting.html 
[https://perma.cc/SXV3-9KG7]; Julie Turkewitz & Vivian Yee, With Grief and Hope, 
Florida Students Take Gun Control Fight on the Road, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018),  
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/us/parkland-students-shooting-
florida.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/JZH4-YFEY]. 
16 See infra Section II.C.1.b (discussing off-campus online student speech that harasses 
others, especially Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2008), in which a 
student’s blog post encouraged her classmates to call the “douchebags in the central 
office” to “piss [them] off”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 434–35 (2007) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (indicating that the attempt to persuade other students to action is 
an important consideration. “It is a gross non sequitur to draw from these two 
unremarkable propositions the remarkable conclusion that the school may suppress 
student speech that was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything.”). 
17 Goldman & Mazzei, supra note 8. 
18 See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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protests, and more recently, March For Our Lives, have proven, the 
youth always has something to say.19 As George Washington once 
noted, should “the freedom of Speech [] be taken away . . . dumb, 
and silent we may be led, like sheep, to the Slaughter.”20 This idea 
is particularly poignant, and all the more salient, when applied to 
the speech of young gun-control advocates who survived a school 
shooting and are attempting to peacefully effect change in their 
society. 
The standard governing school punishment of off-campus 
online speech cannot be based solely on whether the speech is 
likely to disrupt or actually does disrupt the school environment, 
because this standard is too inconsistently applied, and does not 
account for the realities of our interconnected modern world.21 
Rather, in deciding whether a school can constitutionally punish a 
student’s social media post, there are many factors a court must 
consider.22 
Prior to the advent of the internet, a school’s ability to punish a 
student’s speech rested on the context in which the student spoke, 
because speech made in the context of the school environment or 
school activities was a matter of school concern.23 Generally 
speaking, this meant that student speech outside of the school 
context was beyond the school’s punitive reach.24 However, the 
 
19 See Charlotte Alter, The School Shooting Generation Has Had Enough, TIME (Mar. 
22, 2018), http://time.com/longform/never-again-movement/ [https://perma.cc/3QW5-
SKRA]; Maggie Astor, 7 Times in History When Students Turned to Activism, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/us/student-protest-
movements.html [https://perma.cc/5WUH-ESHU]; Erin Blakemore, Youth in Revolt: 
Five Powerful Movements Fueled by Young Activists, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 23, 
2018), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2018/03/youth-activism-young-protesters-
historic-movements/ [https://perma.cc/52J4-AYC4]. 
20 Jacob Lindenbaum, National Gazette, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT VERNON,  
http://www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/national-gazette/ 
[https://perma.cc/KW59-XRNC] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
21 See generally infra Section II.C (discussing case law concerning schools punishing 
students for off-campus online posts). 
22 See generally infra Section II.C (discussing case law concerning schools punishing 
students for off-campus online posts). 
23 See generally infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.4 (discussing student school speech First 
Amendment case law, including Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse). 
24 See generally infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.4 (discussing student school speech First 
Amendment case law, including Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse). 
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internet allows students to reach each other at all times with 
unprecedented ease,25 and consequently, the lines designating 
speech as made in a school context have become increasingly less 
clear.26 Though a student might post something online from home, 
his peers might read that post at school. On the other hand, his 
peers might read something he posts at school when they get home. 
Because of the prevalence of mobile phones, tablets, and 
computers,27 and the resulting ease with which students can reach 
each other seemingly anytime or anywhere, the location of the 
speaker is less indicative than ever of the speech’s relation to the 
school. 
As the speaker’s location is in many instances no longer any 
help in determining whether the student speech is a matter of 
school concern, a school may look to the character of the speaker’s 
intended audience.28 Depending on the content of the post, a post 
that is entirely public may necessitate more school involvement 
than a post whose audience is limited to the speaker’s close friends 
or family.29 It is unlikely that not a single member of the school 
community would see a student’s post, as surely many of his 
“friends”30 online are his classmates. Reaching an audience of 
 
25 See Jon Henley, Teenagers and Technology: ‘I’d Rather Give Up My Kidney Than 
My Phone,’ THE GUARDIAN (July 16, 2010, 3:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2010/jul/16/teenagers-mobiles-facebook-
social-networking [https://perma.cc/NND8-ULFJ]. 
26 See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 864 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 
2002) (noting that “the advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions of 
speech”); see also infra Sections II.B.1–II.B.4 (discussing student speech First 
Amendment case law, including Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse); see also infra 
Section II.C (discussing student off-campus online speech First Amendment case law). 
27 Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015: A Majority of 
American Teens Report Access to a Computer, Game Console, Smartphone and a Tablet, 
PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/a-
majority-of-american-teens-report-access-to-a-computer-game-console-smartphone-and-
a-tablet/ [https://perma.cc/FJ9M-26G9]. 
28 See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing case law concerning the privacy or publicity of 
students’ off-campus online posts and the schools’ ability to punish those posts). 
29 See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing case law concerning the privacy or publicity of 
students’ off-campus online posts and the schools’ ability to punish those posts). 
30 When two people are “friends” with or “followers” of each other on a social media 
platform, they can see each other’s posted content and interact with each other’s social 
media pages, subject to alterations in standard privacy settings that each user controls for 
his own profile. For example, if A is “friends” with B on Facebook, A and B have access 
2019] THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER 367 
 
some kind is arguably the main purpose of posting online at all. 
While there is of course generally some public aspect to anything 
posted on the internet, the speaker may make efforts to keep his 
speech confined to a small audience. Perhaps the speech generates 
considerable interaction31 from peers at the speaker’s school, or it 
might be that the speech is of no consequence to the school 
community at all. The makeup of the audience can help a school 
distinguish between these two situations, but is not necessarily 
determinative of a school’s ability to get involved.32 
A school must therefore also consider what the student’s social 
media post actually means when determining its relation to the 
school.33 Deciphering student posts is no easy task, as the 
significance, or seriousness, of speech on social media is not 
always immediately clear. For example, if one student posts about 
funeral arrangements for a loved one on Facebook,34 and another 
student “likes” that post,35 the student who “liked” the post is 
 
to each other’s content on Facebook, subject to privacy settings either user might set to 
restrict the other’s access to his content. See Carolyn Abram, What It Means To Be 
Friends on Facebook, DUMMIES, https://www.dummies.com/social-media/facebook
/what-it-means-to-be-friends-on-facebook/ [https://perma.cc/2554-RMR7] (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2019); Friending, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com
/help/1540345696275090/?helpref=hc_fnav [https://perma.cc/HQ9T-3FQ7] (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2019); see also Follower, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/follower [https://perma.cc/TMD6-RAG6] (last visited Jan. 26, 
2019) (defining a “follower” as “one who subscribes to a feed especially on social 
media”).  
31 Meaning other students comment on, “like,” or similarly “react” to the post. See 
generally infra note 35 for further discussion of what it might actually mean to “like” a 
post on social media. 
32 See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing case law concerning the privacy or publicity of 
students’ off-campus online posts and schools’ ability to punish those posts). 
33 See infra Sections II.C.1–II.C.2 (discussing the nature and subject of students’ off-
campus online posts and schools’ ability to punish those posts). 
34 Facebook is a social networking platform “that promotes and facilitates interaction 
between friends, family, and colleagues.” Facebook, TECHOPEDIA, 
https://www.techopedia.com/definition/4941/facebook [https://perma.cc/BD7Q-8AMA] 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2018). Its features include “customized profile, privacy, and security, 
friend list management, photo album management, interactive chat, fan pages, classmates 
and coworker search engines.” Id. 
35 When a user “likes” a social media post, the caption of that post will read, e.g., 
“John Doe likes this.” To “like” a post is to express an interest in some aspect of the post, 
or of the post as a whole. There is no way to indicate what a “like” means expressly 
unless the user comments to illustrate his thoughts. Some platforms, e.g., Facebook, 
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probably not indicating that she is excited about the funeral or that 
fact that the friend’s loved one has died. Rather, she might be 
showing support of the bereaved friend in a difficult time, or she 
might be indicating that she will attend the funeral service. 
Likewise, if a student posts a photo of a shotgun on Facebook, and 
another student “likes” that photo, this interaction does not 
necessarily mean the two students are planning an act of violence; 
it might be that the two students share a mutual affection for 
hunting. The same can be said of the student who posts favorite 
song lyrics on social media, and those lyrics happen to be violent.  
While it is possible that this post may concern the school, it just as 
easily may be the student’s preferred avenue for expressing an 
appreciation of a specific artist or sentiment.36 Without further 
explanation from the student, a school could not be sure what 
exactly his post meant beyond his expressed interest in the song, 
particularly because he is not the original author of the lyrics. 
These are but a few examples illustrating the possible ambiguity of 
communications made through social media, highlighting yet 
another challenge schools face in determining whether to punish a 
student’s off-campus online speech. 
As educators and parents strive to understand and traverse both 
the perilous and the positive aspects of a digital social world that 
did not exist when they were children, the most glaring question of 
all arises: what role should schools play in regulating students’ 
online behavior? Schools and courts cannot continue to stretch a 
 
allow a user to assign a happy face, sad face, or angry face (each its own emoji, deemed a 
“reaction”), to a post as an alternative to the “thumbs up” emoji associated with a “like.” 
Other platforms, like Instagram, allow a user only to press a heart icon to express interest, 
or to comment on the photo posted. 
36 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 397 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (deciding a student’s rap video posted to YouTube and Facebook 
concerned the school); see also Elonis v. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2002 (2015) (examining 
the seemingly threatening rap lyrics that a man posted to Facebook, and deciding that it 
was error to instruct the jury “that the Government need prove only that a reasonable 
person would regard Elonis’s communications as threats . . . [because] [f]ederal criminal 
liability generally does not turn solely on the results of an act without considering the 
defendant’s mental state.”). Though Elonis involves an adult speaker and not a student, 
the analysis illustrates that the meaning of a social media post can be ambiguous. 
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fifty-year-old standard37 to fit speech that it was never meant to 
encompass. In advocating for an update to the standard, this Note 
will investigate this issue in four parts. Part I of this Note will 
explore current controversies in the ongoing struggle to balance a 
student’s free speech rights regarding speech posted online from 
off campus against a public school’s need to maintain order and 
civility in its environment. Part II will delve into the current legal 
standard governing cases in which a school punished a student for 
his off-campus online speech, and examine the different facets of 
student posts that courts have considered in determining a school’s 
ability to punish its student for said off-campus online speech. Part 
III will analyze the costs and benefits of the judiciary’s current 
approach as explained in Part II. Finally, Part IV will recommend 
an altered legal standard that aims to encompass off-campus online 
student speech that is truly of school concern, while protecting that 
off-campus online speech that allows students to engage with the 
world as they grow, learn, and become contributing members of 
society. The proposed standard, when applied, would lead to more 
consistent outcomes across courts than the current standard does at 
present. 
I. THE INTERNET IS HERE TO STAY 
Though the internet allows us to communicate with each other 
more easily than ever before, that communication is seemingly 
endless, for “when we connect to the Internet, we do not enter a 
separate space. Networked interactions are embedded in real 
life . . . the digital and the physical are enmeshed. We cannot ‘log 
out.’”38 The effects of our incessant connectivity are not confined 
to the internet as “life online bleeds into life offline and vice 
versa.”39 In fact, in the nearly fifty years since it was invented to 
 
37 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see also infra 
Sections II.A–II.B. 
38 DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 20 (Harvard Univ. Press 
2014). 
39 Id. 
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aid in military communications,40 the internet has become such an 
integral part of American existence that ninety-two percent of 
teenagers go online daily.41 Forty-five percent of teenagers are 
online “almost constantly,”42 and nearly nine out of ten teens 
report accessing the internet multiple times per day.43 
The omnipresence of cell phones, and particularly 
smartphones, facilitates this hyperconnectivity, ensuring teens are 
rarely far away from an internet connection. Ninety-five percent of 
teens have access to a smartphone,44 and ninety-one percent of 
teens “go online from mobile devices at least occasionally.”45 
Given this hyper-ability to connect, it is not surprising that the 
average American teen consumes media for nine hours daily, 
excluding media consumed for school or homework purposes.46 
Their media consumption includes “watching TV, movies, and 
online videos; playing video, computer, and mobile games; using 
social media; using the Internet; reading; and listening to music.”47 
Nearly half of teens “spend their free time [after school] on social 
 
40 Ben Tarnoff, How the Internet Was Invented, THE GUARDIAN (July 15, 2016, 7:00 
AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/15/how-the-internet-was-
invented-1976-arpa-kahn-cerf [https://perma.cc/A5ZQ-SJRV]. 
41 Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Social Media & Technology Overview 2015, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/04/09/teens-social-
media-technology-2015/ [https://perma.cc/P3BL-FY2M]. Teenagers in this report are 
defined as those ages 13–17. Id. 
42 Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018, PEW 
RESEARCH CENTER (May 31, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/teens-social-
media-technology-2018/ [https://perma.cc/BDU3-Z4HM] (noting that “some 45% of 
teens say they use the internet ‘almost constantly,’ a figure that has nearly doubled from 
the 24% who said this in the 2014–2015 survey”). Teenagers in this report are defined as 
those ages 13–17. Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Lenhart, supra note 41.  
46 Vicky Rideout, The Common Sense Census: Media Use by Tweens and Teens, 
COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. 14–15 (2015), https://www.commonsensemedia.org
/sites/default/files/uploads/research/census_executivesummary.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GM24-FWHG]. “A majority of teens (57 percent) spend more than four 
hours per day with screen media. (The non-screen portion of young people’s media use 
includes listening to music and reading print.)” Id. at 15. 
47 Id. at 15. 
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media or texting with friends,”48 and seventy-one percent of teens 
frequent more than one social media site.49 
Surely excessive internet usage, as excessive use of anything, 
can have adverse health effects on the user.50 However, the impact 
of internet usage on children and teens is of particular concern, as 
they are now developing the habits that they will carry with them 
through life.51  While about thirty-one percent of teens believe that 
social media and the like have a positive effect on people their age, 
about twenty-four percent feel the effect is negative, and another 
forty-five percent feel the effect is neither positive nor negative.52 
In comparison, nearly two-thirds of teachers find that their 
students’ connectivity has improved their ability not only to multi-
task effectively, but also to locate information quickly and 
efficiently.53 One teacher observed that the media available to 
students have improved the way students collaborate, noting that 
students “communicate with their peers a lot through texting, plan 
events and generally are more engaged with the world.”54 Some 
teachers have found that “their students’ use of media has 
broadened their horizons by exposing them to diverse viewpoints 
 
48 How Teens Spend Their After-School Hours, BARNA GROUP (Aug. 29, 2017), 
https://www.barna.com/research/teens-spend-school-hours/ [https://perma.cc/SC7B-
LPE6]. This statistic is for the 13–17 age group. Id. 
49 February 2016: Teens’ Social Media Use: How They Connect & What It Means for 
Health, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF ADOLESCENT HEALTH, 
https://www.hhs.gov/ash/oah/news/e-updates/february-2016-teens-social-media-
use/index.html [https://perma.cc/H39F-JKA2] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
50 Rosalyn Carson-DeWitt, What Is Internet Addiction?, EVERYDAY HEALTH (Oct. 6, 
2015), https://www.everydayhealth.com/internet-addiction/guide/ [https://perma.cc
/P8Z7-JLW5]. 
51 See Children and Technology: Creating Healthy Eating and Living Habits, 
MAXLIVING (May 4, 2018), https://maxliving.com/healthy-articles/children-and-
technology [https://perma.cc/F6LG-VHAU]. 
52 Anderson & Jiang, supra note 42. 
53 Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, In Some 
Areas, Teachers Are More Likely To Say That Entertainment Media Have Helped Rather 
Than Hurt Their Students Academically, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/children-teens-and-entertainment-media-
the-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-4%3A—some-media-helping-to-improve-
performance [https://perma.cc/24DD-KQHX]. 
54 Id. 
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and experiences.”55 They feel “social awareness flourishes with 
students being aware of worldwide issues through YouTube and 
Facebook.”56 
Overall, however, teachers feel entertainment media have had 
more of a negative than a positive effect on the social development 
of their students in general.57 Many teachers believe that “their 
students’ use of entertainment media has hurt their academic 
performance,”58 citing downticks in students’ attention spans, 
writing skills, and quality of homework.59 In addition, teachers 
worry about students’ critical thinking skills and ability to 
communicate face to face.60 Other areas of social development that 
teachers feel are negatively affected in this way include ideas about 
gender relations, attitudes towards authority figures like parents 
and teachers, sexualization, and an increase in both anti-social and 
 
55 Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, Some 
Teachers See a Positive Effect of Media on Children’s Social Development, COMMON 
SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1, 2012), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research
/children-teens-and-entertainment-media-the-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-
7%3A-positive-effects-to-social-development [https://perma.cc/B343-HS43]. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, Many 
Teachers Think Their Students’ Use of Entertainment Media Has Hurt Their Academic 
Performance, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1, 2012), 
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/children-teens-and-entertainment-media-
the-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-1%3A-media-use-impacts-academic-
performance [https://perma.cc/C6XM-CJ57]. “Entertainment media was defined as the 
TV shows, music, video games, texting, iPods, cell phone games, social networking sites, 
apps, computer programs, online videos, and websites students use for fun.” Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. Teachers felt that social media was hurting their students’ face-to-face 
communication skills in 2012, and at the time, forty-nine percent of teens felt that their 
“favorite way to communicate with friends” was in-person (compared to seven percent of 
teens who then favored communicating via social media). Id.; Victoria Rideout & 
Michael B. Robb, Social Media, Social Life: Teens Reveal Their Experiences, COMMON 
SENSE MEDIA, INC. 5 (2018), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/sites/default/files
/uploads/research/2018_cs_socialmediasociallife_fullreport-final-release_2_lowres.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZJ6K-GTH9]. Six years later, only thirty-two percent of teens prefer to 
communicate with friends in-person, and sixteen percent now favor communication via 
social media. Id.  
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aggressive behaviors, such as being mean or acting violently 
towards others.61 
Though they are often described as “glued” to the devices that 
connect them to each other, even teens are not oblivious to the 
effects of their constant connectivity.  Fifty-four percent of teens 
feel that social media “often distracts [them] when [they] should be 
paying attention to the people [they are] with,” and forty-two 
percent feel that the time they devote to social media has detracted 
from the time they “could be spending with friends in person.”62 
Additionally, teens occasionally experience frustration with their 
friends’ and parents’ attachment to their electronic devices,63 and 
nearly forty-five percent wish they could sometimes disconnect 
from their digital lives.64 Though it is impossible to separate fully 
the digital from the physical world, there is a disconnect between 
the two in that almost one third of teenage social media users admit 
to flirting with someone online “that they wouldn’t have flirted 
with in person,” and similarly confess that “they’ve said something 
bad about someone online that they wouldn’t have said in 
person.”65 In many ways, the digital world is a social scene with 
rules, norms, and etiquette all its own.66 But so, too, is the school 
 
61 Children, Teens, and Entertainment Media: The View from the Classroom, Many 
Teachers Think Their Students’ Use of Entertainment Media Has Had a Negative Effect 
on Key Aspects of Their Social Development, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (Nov. 1, 
2012), https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/children-teens-and-entertainment-
media-the-view-from-the-classroom/key-finding-5%3A-negative-effects-to-social-
development [https://perma.cc/C2EW-4B42]. 
62 Rideout & Robb, supra note 60, at 5.  
63 Social Media, Social Life: How Teens View Their Digital Lives—Some Teens Wish 
They Could Disconnect More Often—And That the People Around Them Would, Too, 
COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (June 26, 2012), 
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/social-media-social-life-how-teens-view-
their-digital-lives/key-finding-4%3A-teens-wish-they-could-disconnect-more-often 
[https://perma.cc/A2XX-CBAJ]. 
64 Id. 
65 Social Media, Social Life: How Teens View Their Digital Lives—Most Teens Prefer 
Face-to-Face Communication, and Many of Them Think Using Social Media Can 
Interfere With That, COMMON SENSE MEDIA, INC. (June 26, 2012), 
https://www.commonsensemedia.org/research/social-media-social-life-how-teens-view-
their-digital-lives/key-finding-3%3A-most-teens-prefer-face-to-face-communication 
[https://perma.cc/6JYP-VVD4]. 
66 See generally Jessica Contrera, 13, Right Now, WASHINGTON POST (May 25, 2016), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/style/2016/05/25/13-right-now-this-is-what-its-like-
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environment its own entity in need of unique rules and 
government, and at present, a “widespread lack of literacy about 
matters related to the Internet”67 makes it difficult to reconcile the 
digital lives of students with the school’s own administration. 
Though each state defines its schools differently,68 public 
schools in the United States are generally those that are operated 
by the state and funded by public money.69 The Fourteenth 
Amendment, “as now applied to the States, protects the citizen 
against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of 
Education not excepted.”70 Though public school boards of 
education have “important, delicate, and highly discretionary 
functions” in “educating the youth for citizenship,” the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects citizens against those running public schools, 
as these administrators in their official roles act in the name of the 
state.71 
Although the Fourteenth Amendment protects the 
constitutional rights of school children, the Supreme Court has 
noted that those rights may not correspond exactly to the rights of 
an adult American citizen, as constitutional protections must be 
“applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.”72 Children have much to learn in not only academic 
endeavors, but also about social conventions, and schools attempt 
to inculcate students with the tools they will need to be well-
informed, functioning members of society upon graduation. 
Therefore, the Court has recognized that while students cannot be 
subjected to only those ideas that are state-approved,73 there is an 
incontestable “need for affirming the comprehensive authority of 
 
to-grow-up-in-the-age-of-likes-lols-and-longing/?utm_term=.a6e18bc84d57 
[https://perma.cc/KK97-3GPK] (exploring what it’s like to be a teenage girl these days). 
67 CITRON, supra note 38, at 20. 
68 Kyle Zinth, What Is a Public School? Examples and Definitions, EDUCATION 
COMMISSION OF THE STATES (Sept. 2005), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/64
/13/6413.pdf [https://perma.cc/TEB6-T4PT]. 
69 See generally id. 
70 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969). 
71 See id. at 507, 509; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986). 
72 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
73 Id. at 511. 
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the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental 
constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in 
schools.”74 
In helping to shape the citizens of the future, schools have 
recognized that “teenagers need guidance navigating the 
challenges of having an online presence.”75 And, in fact, schools 
nationwide are educating students and parents alike about “online 
safety and digital responsibility,” an endeavor which need not 
deprive children of enjoyment of their online culture.76 Rather, 
civics lessons in many schools now aim to  teach the 
“fundamentals of digital citizenship,”77 and focus on the “various 
ways online activities deepen civic engagement, political and 
cultural participation, and public conversation.”78 
However, despite these necessary lessons in digital citizenship, 
and given the need to balance the rights of students with the rights 
of schools, tensions are understandably high where schools attempt 
to regulate student speech, and the debate has only become more 
contentious as schools try to regulate students’ online activity. 
Though schools retain the ability to govern their hallways, online 
student speech can only be restricted to a certain extent, 
particularly considering the importance of an online presence to a 
modern teenager. For “free speech promotes ‘democracy in the 
widest possible sense, not merely at the level of governance, or at 
the level of deliberation, but at the level of culture, where we 
interact, create, build communities and build ourselves.’ Online 
speech is crucial for self-government and cultural engagement.”79 
We cannot hope, nor should we try, to deprive our students of 
these opportunities. We can, however, balance the rights of the 
schools against the rights of the students, and allow schools to 
show their students that by using the internet responsibly, students 
 
74 Id. at 507. 
75 CITRON, supra note 38, at 227. 
76 See id. at 247–48 (discussing journalist Julia Angwin’s approach to “active 
engagement in her kids’ online lives”). 
77 Id. at 227. 
78 Id. at 194. 
79 Id. (citing Professor Jack Balkin). 
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can raise their voices to help better themselves and their 
communities. 
II. FREE SPEECH REIGNS—TO AN EXTENT: A DISSECTION OF 
CURRENT DOCTRINE 
A. The First Amendment Guarantees Free Speech to Adults 
Within Limits 
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”80 Though the language of the First 
Amendment may seem clear, its application is not always simple.81 
Since the ratification of the Bill of Rights over 225 years ago,82 the 
Supreme Court of the United States has wrestled with the issues 
that arise when free speech is guaranteed to a society.83 While our 
country has a “profound national commitment to the principle that 
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open,”84 the need for uninhibited discussion must be balanced 
against Government interests in regulating certain kinds of speech. 
Therefore, rather than an absolute protection of any and all kinds 
of speech, “the First Amendment has been interpreted as an 
 
80 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
81 See generally What Does Free Speech Mean?, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-
outreach/activity-resources/what-does [https://perma.cc/FEB8-SY73] (last visited Nov. 6, 
2018) (explaining what freedom of speech generally encompasses, and what it does not). 
82 Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INST., 
http://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZG3-VLSF] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
83 See generally What Does Free Speech Mean?,  supra note 82 (explaining what 
freedom of speech generally encompasses, and what it does not); see also Lata Nott, Is 
Your Speech Protected by the First Amendment?, NEWSEUM INST., 
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/primers/basics/ 
[https://perma.cc/8MJC-FHH5] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018) (dissecting whether a given 
issue might raise First Amendment claims with a basic guide). 
84 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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instruction to treat rules limiting speech with a high level of 
suspicion.”85 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that “at the heart of the 
First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance 
of the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest 
and concern,”86  and in doing so has distinguished that which must 
be protected by the First Amendment from that which cannot be. 
To begin, “if there is a bedrock principle underlying the First 
Amendment, it is that government may not prohibit the expression 
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
disagreeable.”87 
In this vein, the Supreme Court has decided that freedom of 
speech includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the right to speak 
symbolically in protest (as, for example, one does when burning 
the American Flag88 or wearing a symbolic article of clothing in 
protest, like an armband),89 the right to use offensive words in a 
political message,90 and the right to refrain from speaking 
altogether.91 As a country we allow more speech than is desirable 
to some people, because living with the consequences of that 
sometimes unwanted speech is preferable to allowing the 
government to decide categorically which ideas are permissible 
topics of discussion and which are not.92 
Still, the Court has found that the First Amendment does not 
protect certain speech,93 and in fact “permits restrictions upon the 
content of speech in a few limited areas, which are of such slight 
 
85 CITRON, supra note 38, at 199. 
86 Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988). 
87 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
88 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397. 
89 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
90 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
91 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
92 See CITRON, supra note 38, at 199–200. 
93 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 
315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)) (discussing that the “protections afforded by the First 
Amendment . . . are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the government may 
regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution”). See generally 
Nott, supra note 83 (dissecting whether a given issue might raise First Amendment 
claims with a basic guide). 
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social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived 
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”94 Unprotected categories of speech include that which 
communicates a true threat,95 incites harmful action,96 or that 
involves the production and distribution of obscene materials.97 
B. Constitutional Rights of Children Are Not Necessarily the 
Same as Those of Adults 
In its exploration of the scope of First Amendment protection, 
the Supreme Court has encountered several problems concerning 
free speech in public schools.98 Whether in school or out of school, 
students “are ‘persons’ under our Constitution,” and “are possessed 
of fundamental rights which the State must respect . . . .”99 Public 
school officials who seek to punish student speech do so as state 
actors100 on behalf of the United States government,101 and any 
such punishment may therefore run afoul of the First 
Amendment.102 Nonetheless, the Court has recognized that because 
 
94 Black, 538 U.S. at 358–59 (internal citations omitted). 
95 Id. at 359. The Court explains that the “First Amendment permits a state to ban ‘true 
threats,’ e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708, 89 S. Ct. 1399, 22 L.Ed.2d 664 
(per curiam), which encompass those statements where the speaker means to 
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a 
particular individual or group of individuals . . . . The speaker need not actually intend to 
carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protects individuals from the fear 
of violence and the disruption that fear engenders, as well as from the possibility that the 
threatened violence will occur.” Id. at 344. 
96 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
97 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
98 See supra note 11 (explaining that this Note analyzes the First Amendment rights of 
American public school students only). 
99 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
100 See id. at 507, 509; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 
(1986). 
101 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (asserting that “[w]hen public school 
authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State; they do not stand in 
the shoes of the students’ parents.”) (Alito, J., concurring); see also Tinker, 393 U.S. at 
507 (noting that the Court has said “the Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the 
States, protects the citizen against the State itself and all of its creatures—Boards of 
Education not excepted.”); id. at 509 (stipulating that “in order for the State in the person 
of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression . . . ”) (emphasis 
added). 
102 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (explaining that “[i]n order for the State in the person of 
school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able 
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of the important role educators play in raising the next generation 
of American citizens, there is a need to uphold the “comprehensive 
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with 
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.”103 The Supreme Court has addressed this 
tension multiple times over the last fifty years, and has ultimately 
determined that while neither “students [nor] teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
school house gate,”104 “the constitutional rights of students in 
public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings.”105 
The Supreme Court has decided four cases in the past fifty 
years that help strike the balance between the free speech rights of 
students and the need for educators to maintain order in schools.106 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District set 
forth the standard on which the other three subsequent decisions 
expand, stipulating that a school may punish a student’s self-
expression where that expression “materially and substantially” 
disrupts the “operation of the school” or “collid[es] with the rights 
of others.”107 Building on this idea, the Court found in Fraser that 
schools may punish student speech that “undermine[s] the school’s 
basic educational mission” in its vulgarity or lewdness.108 
Similarly, the Hazelwood Court decided that school officials can 
constitutionally preside in an editorial capacity over expressive 
student speech in school-sponsored activities if their edits are 
 
to show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the 
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly 
where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would 
‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in 
the operation of the school,’ the prohibition cannot be sustained.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
103 Id. at 507. 
104 Id. at 506. 
105 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
106 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Tinker v. 
Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); see infra Sections II.B.1–
II.B.4 (discussing each of these cases in turn). 
107 393 U.S. at 513 (internal citations omitted). 
108 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
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“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”109 Finally, 
the Court determined that a school’s ability to apply these 
standards cannot be constricted by the physical bounds of the 
schoolyard, and found that student code of conduct rules apply 
during “school-sanctioned activities,” such as field trips.110 This 
determination allowed the Court to find that schools need not 
“tolerate at school events student expression”111 that “they 
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”112 This Part 
examines the Court’s reasoning in each of these cases in depth 
below. 
1. Tinker 
Current law governing the regulation of public-school student 
speech stems from one landmark Supreme Court decision. In 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the 
Court evaluated the contentious school punishment of a few high 
school students who were suspended for wearing black armbands 
to school in protest of the Vietnam War.113 The school argued a 
need to quell the student speech because armbands protesting such 
a controversial war might cause disruption among the students, and 
decided that the suspensions would last until the protesting 
students returned to school without their armbands.114 Finding the 
school’s justification for punishment reasonable, the District Court 
dismissed the students’ complaint.115 The equally divided Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision en banc on 
appeal, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted 
certiorari.116 
In its analysis of the issue, the Supreme Court emphasized that 
wearing such armbands in protest is “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’ 
which, [it has] repeatedly held, is entitled to comprehensive 
 
109 Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 484 U.S. at 273. 
110 Morse, 551 U.S. at 400–01. 
111 Id. at 410. 
112 Id. at 408 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
113 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
114 Id. at 504. 
115 Id. at 504–05. 
116 Id. at 505. 
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protection under the First Amendment.”117 Asserting, however, 
that First Amendment rights in schools must be “applied in light of 
the special characteristics of the school environment,”118 the Court 
employed a balancing test to address the tensions that emerge 
where student speech conflicts with school policy.119 Tinker 
stipulates that a student may express his opinion “if he does so 
without materially and substantially interfering with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school and without colliding with the rights of others.”120 The 
Court expounded on this standard, noting that student conduct 
“ . . . in class or out of it, which for any reason—whether it seems 
from time, place, or type of behavior—materially disrupts 
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights 
of others is . . . not immunized by the constitutional guarantees of 
freedom of speech.”121 The Court was careful to emphasize that 
though a school may punish speech that it reasonably forecasts to 
be or deems actually substantially disruptive,122 it must be “able to 
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere 
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”123 
Notably, the school did not prohibit students from wearing 
political or controversial symbols of any kind all together, but only 
these specific armbands.124 The Court stated that “the prohibition 
of expression of one particular opinion, at least without evidence 
that it is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference 
with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally 
permissible.”125 The armbands caused “discussion outside of the 
classroom,”126 but because the protesting students “neither 
interrupted school activities nor sought to intrude in the school 
 
117 Id. at 505–06. 
118 Id. at 506. 
119 Id. at 507. 
120 Id. at 513 (internal citations omitted). 
121 Id. at 513. This will hereinafter be referred to as the “Tinker standard.” 
122 Id. at 514. 
123 Id. at 509. 
124 Id. at 510–11. 
125 Id. at 511. 
126 Id. at 514. 
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affairs or the lives of others,”127 the Court concluded that the 
school could not Constitutionally prohibit the protesting students’ 
speech.128 The Court has taken up the issue in more detail since 
deciding Tinker in 1969, but the Tinker test129 has served as a 
helpful signpost in cases involving the free speech rights of 
students. 
2. Fraser 
Expanding on Tinker, the Supreme Court noted in Bethel 
School District v. Fraser130 that the objective of public education is 
to “inculcat[e] [in students the] fundamental values necessary to 
the maintenance of a democratic political system.”131 And because 
the classroom is a “marketplace of ideas,”132 these fundamental 
values “must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political 
and religious views.”133 However, the freedom to espouse 
“unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms 
must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate 
behavior.”134 To teach students the bounds of appropriate social 
interaction in our society involves teaching them what sort of 
language is appropriate for students to use when communicating 
with their peers at school.135 
The controversy in Fraser arose when a high school student 
addressed his classmates at an assembly in a speech nominating a 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 In summary, the Tinker test, or Tinker standard, is the aforementioned principle that 
was first articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 
which provides that a student has a right to express his ideas at school, but only if he does 
so without significantly disrupting the school environment or infringing on the rights of 
his classmates in that environment. Student speech that is significantly disruptive of the 
school environment or infringes on the rights of his classmates is not protected by the 
First Amendment, and is subject to constitutional punishment by the school. Id. at 513–
14; see supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text. 
130 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
131 Id. at 681 (internal citations omitted). 
132 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 739. 
133 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 683. 
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friend for elected student office. Students were required to either 
attend the speech or report to study hall.136 Throughout his speech, 
the speaker used an “elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual 
metaphor”137 that two teachers with whom he had previously 
discussed the speech had warned him not to use.138 The school felt 
that given the captive audience, the relative age and maturity of the 
audience members, and the audience reaction, such sexual 
language was not appropriate, and that the speech violated the 
school rule prohibiting disruptive, obscene behavior.139 The 
speaker was suspended for three days, and removed from the list of 
candidates for commencement speaker at graduation.140 The 
student appealed his punishment to the school board, who affirmed 
the school’s decision, at which point the student brought suit in 
District Court for violation of his First Amendment rights.141 
Though the District Court ruled in favor of the school and the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision,142 the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.143 
The Court ultimately decided that “the First Amendment does 
not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a 
vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the 
 
136 Id. at 677. 
137 Id. at 678. The speaker’s address read as follows: “I know a man who is firm—he’s 
firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his 
belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point 
and pounds it in. If necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack 
things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. Jeff is a 
man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for each and every one of you. So 
vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come between you and the best our 
high school can be.” Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
138 Id. at 678. 
139 Id. at 677–78. 
140 Id. at 678. 
141 Id. at 678–79. 
142 The District Court held that “the school’s sanctions violated the First Amendment, 
that the school’s disruptive-conduct rule was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and 
that the removal of [the student’s] name from the graduation speaker’s list violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 675.  The student was awarded 
monetary relief and the school was prevented from keeping him from speaking at 
commencement. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. 
143 Id. at 677. 
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school’s basic educational mission.”144 While the First Amendment 
allows adults to use profanity or otherwise offensive language to 
express political messages,145  “the constitutional rights of students 
in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights 
of adults in other settings,”146 and a school may therefore 
constitutionally ban “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech,” as 
undermining “the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct” that 
the school wishes to teach its students.147 
3. Hazelwood 
As a school may distance itself from student speech it deems to 
undermine its educational mission,148 so too may it distance itself 
from student speech with which it does not wish to be associated as 
an educational institution.149 Following Fraser, the Court clarified 
that a school’s obligation to tolerate certain student speech (as per 
the Tinker standard)150 does not obligate a school to actively 
promote certain student speech.151 While Tinker addresses an 
“educator’s ability to silence a student’s personal expression that 
happens to occur on the school premises,” the idea of promotion 
concerns an “educator’s authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities 
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”152 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,153 the Court 
concluded that the “standard articulated in Tinker for determining 
when a school may punish student expression154 need not also be 
 
144 Id. at 685. 
145 Id. at 682. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. at 683. 
148 Id. at 675. 
149 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
150 Id. at 270. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. at 271. 
153 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988). 
154 See supra notes 114, 130 and accompanying text. 
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the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its 
name and resources to the dissemination of student expression.”155 
This issue arose when a principal censored portions of a school 
newspaper shortly before its publication. The student journalists 
who contributed to the paper did so as part of a journalism class,156 
and every edition of the paper was edited and reviewed by both the 
teacher of the class and the school principal.157  The final edition of 
the paper that school year was set to include an article about teen 
pregnancy at Hazelwood East high school, and an article about the 
effect of divorce on students at the high school,158 but the principal 
was concerned about the content of the articles in relation to the 
audience.159 Because it was late April, the principal “believed there 
was no time to make the necessary changes in the stories before the 
scheduled press run and that the newspaper would not appear 
before the end of the school year if printing were delayed to any 
significant extent.”160 Rather than print no newspaper at all, the 
principal chose to redact the two controversial articles from the 
final edition of the school’s newspaper before publication.161 
Thereafter, the students brought suit in District Court for violation 
of their First Amendment rights, and the District Court found that 
no such violation had occurred.162 The Court of Appeals for the 
 
155 484 U.S. at 272–73. 
156 Id. at 262, 268. 
157 Id. at 263, 269. 
158 Id. at 263. 
159 Id. at 264. “[Principal] Reynolds was concerned that, although the pregnancy story 
used false names ‘to keep the identity of these girls a secret,’ the pregnant students still 
might be identifiable from the text. He also believed that the article’s references to sexual 
activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students at the 
school. In addition, Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the 
divorce story had complained that her father ‘wasn’t spending enough time with my 
mom, my sister and I’ prior to the divorce, ‘was always out of town on business or out 
late playing cards with the guys,’ and ‘always argued about everything’ with her mother. 
Reynolds believed that the student’s parents should have been given an opportunity to 
respond to these remarks or to consent to their publication. He was unaware that [the 
teacher of the journalism class] had deleted the student’s name from the final version of 
the article.” Id. at 263 (internal citations omitted). 
160 Id. at 263–64. 
161 Id. at 264. 
162 Id. 
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Eighth Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.163 
Fraser allows for a school to “disassociate itself” from student 
speech that is “wholly inconsistent with the fundamental values of 
public school education,”164 and Hazelwood expands on this idea 
to permit a school, “in its capacity as publisher of a school 
newspaper or producer of a school play” to reject student “speech 
that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately 
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable 
for immature audiences.”165 That is to say, the First Amendment 
does not prevent educators from “exercising editorial control over 
the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored 
expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related 
to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”166 
4. Morse 
The regulation of the student speech at issue in Tinker, Fraser, 
and Hazelwood stems from the need for a school to manage the 
school environment and other educational concerns.167  
Significantly, the speech at issue in all three of those cases 
occurred on school grounds.168 The school environment is not 
strictly limited to the school grounds, however, and accordingly, 
“there is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when 
courts should apply school speech precedents.”169 The Court 
addressed this question at least in part in deciding Morse v. 
Frederick.170 
The dispute in Morse stems from a school-sanctioned event in 
which students attended the Olympic Torch Relay (the “Relay”) 
 
163 Id. at 265–66. 
164 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (internal citations 
omitted). 
165 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271. 
166 Id. at 273. 
167 See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–II.B.3. 
168 See discussion supra Sections II.B.1–II.B.3. 
169 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (citing Porter v. Ascension Parish 
Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (2004)). 
170 Id. 
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passing through their town of Juneau, Alaska in 2002.171 Students 
were permitted to attend the Relay as it passed down a street 
adjacent to the school, and were supervised by school faculty 
throughout the event.172 A group of students, apparently enticed by 
the press that was covering the event, unfurled a large banner that 
read “BONG HiTS 4 [sic] JESUS” in lettering clearly visible from 
the other side of the road.173 The school principal immediately 
asked the students to take down the banner because she feared it 
promoted illegal drug use, and she confiscated it when all but one 
student complied.174 The noncompliant student was suspended for 
ten days and when his suspension was upheld on appeal to the 
superintendent, the student filed suit alleging his First Amendment 
rights had been violated.175  The District Court found in favor of 
the school, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.176 
Having granted certiorari, the Supreme Court determined that 
an “approved social event or class trip” that was sanctioned by the 
principal, supervised by school faculty, and that took place during 
normal school hours was a “school-sanctioned activity,” to which 
the school’s student code of conduct rules applied.177  The Court 
also found that  the “‘special characteristics of the school 
environment,’ and governmental interest in stopping student drug 
abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression that they 
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”178 Consequently, 
the Court held that “the First Amendment does not require schools 
to tolerate at school events student expression that contributes to 
those dangers.”179 Despite having elaborated on the boundaries of 
the schoolyard in this way, however, the Supreme Court has yet to 
delineate where schools are to draw the line in relation to student 
 
171 Id. at 397. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 398. 
175 Id. at 398–99. 
176 Id. at 399. 
177 Id. at 400–01. 
178 Id. at 408 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 
(1969)). 
179 Id. at 410. 
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speech that is posted online from outside of school and after school 
hours.180 
C. An Uncertain Standard Governs Off-Campus Online Student 
Speech 
In the Internet Age, balancing student free speech rights and 
the need for school officials to maintain order in schools has 
become more difficult.181 While it is not disputed that online posts 
are speech that is entitled to First Amendment protection,182 “the 
advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions on 
speech,”183 and of restrictions on student speech in particular.  
Schools may regulate student online speech that is posted on 
campus or using campus resources per the Tinker standard and its 
progeny.184 But having denied certiorari to Bell v. Itawamba 
County School Board,185 the Supreme Court has not decided 
whether Tinker applies to student speech that is posted online from 
off campus, or even whether there exists a relationship between 
off-campus online speech and the school at all.186  However, of the 
six circuits to have addressed this issue, five have held that Tinker 
does apply in such instances.187  In the “other of the six circuits [to 
have addressed the question] (the third circuit), there is an intra-
circuit split.”188 
 
180 The Court most recently declined to hear a case of this nature by denying certiorari 
to Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
1166 (2016). 
181 See discussion infra Sections II.C.1–II.C.3. 
182 Nott, supra note 94; see generally Robert Corn-Revere, Internet & First Amendment 
Overview, NEWSEUM INST., http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-
center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/internet-first-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/E2WU-
EUDN] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
183 J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863–64 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 
2002). 
184 See supra Sections II.A–II.B. 
185 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
186 Section II.C discusses cases arising from student speech that was posted online from 
off campus, away from any school-sponsored event, and with the use of no school 
resources, and that was subsequently punished in some way by the speakers’ schools. 
187 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1166 (2016). The “remainder of the circuits (first, sixth, seventh, tenth, eleventh, 
D.C.) do not appear to have addressed this issue.” Id. at 394. 
188 Id. at 393. 
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Though Tinker has generally been applied to off-campus online 
student speech by courts that have addressed the matter,189 there is 
no consensus as to what sort of online student speech can be 
reasonably deemed to be foreseeably or actually disruptive of the 
school environment such that the school may constitutionally 
punish the speaker.  That is, once Tinker is applied, there is no 
standard governing what sort of off-campus online speech is 
reasonably forecast as or is actually disruptive of a school 
environment. In the absence of a standard, and because the 
disciplinary decisions of school officials are owed deference to 
some extent,190 courts generally consider the totality of the 
circumstances of the off-campus online student speech in each case 
when evaluating the school’s ability to punish the speaker. Factors 
that courts have considered in these evaluations include: 
 
189 Id. For example, the Second Circuit allows schools to punish off-campus online 
student speech under Tinker’s test of forecasted substantial disruption “at least when it 
[is] similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression might also reach campus.” 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). 
Similarly, “the general rule [of the Eighth Circuit] is that off-campus statements are 
protected under the First Amendment and not punishable by school authorities unless 
they are true threats or are reasonably calculated to reach the school environment and are 
so egregious as to pose a serious safety risk or other substantial disruption in that 
environment.” Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 856 (D. 
Minn. 2015) (2011) (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit 
dictates that “Tinker governs our analysis . . . when a student intentionally directs at the 
school community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, 
and intimidate a teacher, even when such speech originated and was disseminated, off-
campus without the use of school resources.” Bell, 799 F.3d at 396. 
190 See Bell, 799 F.3d at 393 (noting “the paramount need for school officials to be able 
to react quickly and efficiently to protect students and faculty from threats, intimidation, 
and harassment intentionally directed at the school community” [without fearing 
litigation]); see also Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Bd., 728 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 
2013) (stating “we look to all of the circumstances confronting the school officials that 
might reasonably portend disruption”); id. at 1072 (noting that the court’s responsibility 
“is not to parse the wisdom of [the school’s] actions, but to determine whether they were 
constitutional.”); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 
40 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008) (stating that “we are mindful that it 
is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which 
the court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.”) (internal citations 
omitted); Bell, 799 F.3d at 398, (observing “that courts should not interfere with the day-
to-day operations of schools is a platitudinous but eminently sound maxim which this 
court has reaffirmed on many occasions.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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The nature and content of the speech, the objective 
and subjective seriousness of the speech, and the 
severity of the possible consequences should the 
speaker take action; the relationship of the speech to 
the school, the intent of the speaker to disseminate, 
or keep private, the speech, and the nature, and 
severity, of the school’s response in disciplining the 
student; whether the speaker expressly identified an 
educator or student by name or reference, and past 
incidents arising out of similar speech; the manner 
in which the speech reached the school community; 
the intent of the school in disciplining the student; 
and the occurrence of other in-school disturbances, 
including administrative disturbances involving the 
speaker, such as ‘school officials having to spend 
considerable time dealing with these concerns and 
ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in 
place,’ brought about ‘because of the need to 
manage’ concerns over the speech.191 
These factors are many and varied, for as Judge D. Brooks 
Smith of the Third Circuit notes, were the standard to “turn solely 
on where the speaker was sitting when the speech was originally 
uttered,” that standard “would fail to accommodate the somewhat 
‘everywhere at once’ nature of the Internet,”192 and further, would 
fail to contemplate the “special characteristics of the school 
environment.”193 Many of these factors are intertwined, and must 
be evaluated as such. The entangled nature of some factors often 
complicates the analysis of the student speech at issue and leads to 
less predictable outcomes of seemingly similar cases. Accordingly, 
 
191 Bell, 799 F.3d at 398 (internal citations omitted). 
192 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring). 
193 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see also 
Bell, 799 F.3d at 396 (noting that “in holding Tinker applies to the off-campus speech in 
this instance, because such determinations are heavily influenced by the facts in each 
matter, we decline: to adopt any rigid standard in this instance; or to adopt or reject 
approaches advocated by other circuits”); Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1069 (stipulating that “a 
student’s profanity-laced parody of a principal is hardly the same as a threat of a school 
shooting, and we are reluctant to try and craft a one-size fits all approach.”). 
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determining the reasonableness of discipline based on forecasted or 
actual substantial disruption resulting from online student speech is 
more of an art than a science, and the courts’ considerations are 
worth organizing into analytical categories to explore further in-
depth. 
1. Nature of Post 
The nature of the post examined is an important consideration 
in many cases.194 That is, in considering whether the school can 
punish the student expression at issue, many courts weigh heavily 
the character of the student speech, considering, for example,  
whether the post was meant to be artistic, funny, harassing, 
satirical, political, violent, or threatening.195 The analysis of the 
nature of the speech may overlap with other factors the courts 
consider, but is an important factor in and of itself. 
a) Violent/Threatening Speech 
The First Amendment categorically does not protect true 
threats.196 This means that those statements by which “the speaker 
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of 
individuals”197 are not entitled to First Amendment protection. A 
true threat is not negated by the fact that the speaker does not 
intend to carry out his threat,198 as “a prohibition on true threats 
protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the 
disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people 
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”199 
 
194 See discussion infra Section II.C.1. 
195 See discussion infra Section II.C.1. 
196 David L. Hudson, Jr. & Rebecca DeVerter, Online Speech, NEWSEUM INST. (Mar. 
2008), 
http://www.newseuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/k-
12-public-school-student-expression/cyberspeech/ [https://perma.cc/WW47-VT9Y]; see 
generally Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). 
197 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708) (noting 
that “political hyperbole is not a true threat”) (internal citations omitted). 
198 Id. at 360. 
199 Id. (internal citations omitted). Note that “intimidation in the constitutionally 
proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to 
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Some courts choose to evaluate a violent or threatening off-campus 
online student post by this true threat First Amendment standard,200 
but other courts feel that “school officials have significantly 
broader authority to sanction student speech than the [true threat] 
standard allows.”201 
Though aware of “the need to draw a clear line between 
student activity that ‘affects matter of legitimate concern to the 
school community,’ and activity that does not,”202 the Second 
Circuit allows a school to punish a student’s off-campus online 
speech ‘when this conduct would foreseeably create a risk of 
substantial disruption within the school environment,’ at least 
when it [is] similarly foreseeable that the off-campus expression 
might also reach campus.”203 In Wisniewski v. Board of 
Education,204 the court examined an icon displayed next to a 
student’s name on his AOL Instant Messenger account205 that 
depicted a drawing of his teacher being shot with the words “Kill 
Mr. VanderMolen” written beneath, and that was visible to at least 
fifteen of his “buddies”206 online for three weeks.207 Both the 
 
a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm 
or death.” Id. 
200 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008). 
201 Id. at 38. 
202 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 
607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
203 Id. at 48 (quoting Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40). 
204 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 34. 
205 AOL Instant Messenger was a computer software that allowed its users to exchange 
messages in real time over the Internet with their “buddies” (i.e., those with whom one 
had connected on the application). See id. at 35. 
206 See infra note 206 (describing AOL Instant Messenger). 
207 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. After a classmate of the student on whose AOL Instant 
Messenger account the icon appeared brought the icon to the attention of the teacher 
depicted, the student was suspended for a week. Id. The police investigated the student, 
and ultimately found “that the icon was meant as a joke,” and that the student “posed no 
real threat to VanderMolen or any other school official.” Id. The student was assessed by 
a psychologist who reached a similar conclusion, and the criminal investigation of the 
student was closed. Id. The superintendent held a hearing regarding the student’s long-
term suspension, and the hearing officer decided that “the icon was threatening and 
should not have been understood as a joke.” Id. Though the student had posted the icon 
from off-campus, the hearing officer “concluded that it was in violation of school rules 
and disrupted school operations by requiring special attention from school officials, 
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“potentially threatening content of the icon and the extensive 
distribution of it”208 made it reasonably foreseeable that it would 
“come to the attention of school authorities and the teacher whom 
the icon depicted being shot.”209 The court further noted that “there 
can be no doubt that the icon, once made known to the teacher and 
other school officials, would foreseeably create a risk of substantial 
disruption within the school environment.”210 
The Eighth Circuit also addressed a First Amendment question 
arising “from school discipline exercised in response to student 
threats of violence” that were communicated online outside of 
school,211 but were reported directly to the school.212 In D.J.M. ex 
rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Public School District No. 60, a student sent 
instant messages to a friend lamenting that he had been rejected by 
a peer he admired romantically, but that he would let her live if he 
were ever to shoot any of his classmates.213 He then named specific 
students that he would “have to get rid of,” along with groups of 
people that “would have to go” if he were to shoot his 
classmates.214 This student indicated to his friend that he wanted 
“[their high school] to be known for something,”215 and his 
alarmed friend alerted both a trusted adult and the school principal 
of these messages.216 Though constitutionally schools cannot 
“reach out to discover, monitor, or punish any type of out of school 
speech . . . when a report is brought to them about a student 
threatening to shoot specific students at school . . . they have a 
 
replacement of the threatened teacher, and interviewing pupils during class time.” Id. 
With the Board of Education’s approval, the student was suspended for one semester. Id. 
at 37. The student thereafter brought suit in District Court against the superintendent and 
the Board of Education, alleging violation of his First Amendment rights. Id. 
208 Id. at 39. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 40. The icon did, in fact, create a substantial disruption, “requiring special 
attention from school officials, replacement of the threatened teacher, and interviewing 
pupils during class time.” Id. at 36. 
211 D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 761 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 758. 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 Id. 
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difficult and important choice to make about how to react 
consistent with the First Amendment.”217 In this case, the court 
found it reasonably foreseeable that the student’s “threats about 
shooting specific students in school would be brought to the 
attention of school authorities and create a risk of substantial 
disruption within the school environment,”218 noting that the 
student could anticipate that his messages would become known to 
other students, “since a reasonable person should be aware that 
electronic communications can now be easily forwarded.”219 In 
fact, once rumors spread about the messages in question,220 
“school officials had to spend considerable time dealing with [the 
safety] concerns [of parents and students], and ensuring that 
appropriate safety measures were in place”221 at the school.222 
The Ninth Circuit, in deciding Wynar v. Douglas County 
School Board, similarly examined a school’s reaction in a case in 
which a student made threatening communications online from off 
campus to his friends, and those friends reported the messages to 
the school.223 The court noted that students take to the internet to 
discuss all sorts of things “outside of the official school 
environment,”224 and while schools “must take care not to 
 
217 Id. at 765 (internal citations omitted). 
218 Id. at 766 (internal citations omitted). 
219 Id. at 762. 
220 Id. at 765. 
221 Id. at 766. 
222 Subsequent cases have further clarified the Eighth Circuit standard articulated in 
Hannibal. See S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lees Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777 
(8th Cir. 2012) (explaining “in D.J.M. v. Hannibal Public School District #60, we 
indicated that Tinker applies to off-campus student speech where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the speech will reach the school community and cause a substantial 
disruption to the educational setting. 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)”); see also Burge 
ex rel. Burge v. Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1071 (D. Or. 2015) (citing 
Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2013)) (noting that 
“a number of our sister circuits have wrestled with the question of Tinker’s reach beyond 
the schoolyard. The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have concluded that Tinker 
applies to certain off-campus speech. These Circuits have imposed some additional 
threshold test before applying Tinker to speech that originates off campus. For 
example . . . the Eighth Circuit requires that it be ‘reasonably foreseeable that the speech 
will reach the school community . . . ’”). 
223 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013). 
224 Id. at 1064. 
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overreact and to take into account the creative juices and often 
startling writings of the students,”225 students do sometimes 
“communicat[e] electronically . . .  about subjects that threaten the 
safety of the school environment.”226 Indeed, when a student sent 
to his friends from home “increasingly violent and threatening 
instant messages227 . . . bragging about his weapons, threatening to 
shoot specific classmates, intimating that he would ‘take out’ other 
people at a school shooting on a specific date, and invoking the 
image of the Virginia Tech massacre,”228 they became so alarmed 
as to alert school officials.229 The court found that in such cases the 
school must be able to balance student speech concerns against the 
need to “protect their students from credible threats of violence.”230 
Certainly, “given the subject and addressees” of the messages, “it 
is hard to imagine how their nexus to the school could have been 
more direct; for the same reasons, it should have reasonably 
foreseeable to [the student] that his messages would reach 
campus.”231 To be sure, “the alarming nature of the messages 
prompted [the student’s] friends to do exactly what we would hope 
any responsible student would do: report to school authorities,”232 
in the hopes that the school could help. This student’s messages 
“threatened the student body as a whole and targeted specific 
students by name,” not only representing the “quintessential harm 
to the rights of other students to be secure,”233  but also leading to 
what could reasonably be forecast as substantial disruption of the 
school environment.234 
 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
227 See supra note 206 (describing AOL Instant Messenger). 
228 Wynar, 728 F.3d at 1071. 
229 Id. at 1066. 
230 Id. at 1070. 
231 Id. at 1069. 
232 Id. 
233 Id. at 1072. 
234 Id. at 1071. In this scenario, the school officials “reasonably could have predicted 
that they would have to spend considerable time dealing with parents’ and students’ 
concerns and ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place.” Id. (quoting 
D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 
2011)) (internal citations omitted). 
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The Fifth Circuit’s standard governing threatening off-campus 
online speech is more bright-line than those discussed supra, as it 
decided in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board,235 that Tinker 
applies “when a student intentionally directs at the school 
community speech reasonably understood by school officials to 
threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher, even when the speech 
originated off campus.”236 In Bell, a student posted a video of 
himself using vulgar, profane language to rap about two named 
coaches at his high school, accusing the coaches of sexual 
misconduct with female students.237 The lyrics included the 
admonitions, “betta [sic] watch your back,” “I’m going to hit you 
with my [gun],” “going to get a pistol down your mouth,” and 
“he[’ll] get no mercy.”238 The video was posted to both Facebook 
and YouTube, and was accessible on both platforms to the public 
at large.239 Though the student contended he intended neither that 
the coaches hear the rap nor understand it as a threat, he knew that 
his peers would hear it, as “students all have Facebook.”240 Even if 
he only wanted to raise awareness of the coaches alleged 
misconduct as he claimed,241 “the manner in which he voiced his 
concern . . . must be taken seriously by school officials.”242 
Because “threatening, harassing, and intimidating a teacher 
impedes, if not destroys the ability to teach,” and because such 
behavior “disrupts, if not destroys the discipline necessary for an 
environment in which education can take place,” it ultimately 
“disrupts, if not destroys, the very mission for which schools 
exist—to educate,”243 and is reasonably forecast to cause a 
substantial disruption of the school environment.244 
 
235 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 1166 (2016). 
236 Id. at 379. 
237 Id. at 384. 
238 Id. at 384–85. 
239 Id. at 385. 
240 Id. at 386. 
241 Id. at 398. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. at 399–400. 
244 Id. at 400. 
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Assuming Tinker applies to off-campus online student speech, 
and because the speech at issue in each of the cases discussed 
above was reasonably forecast as substantially disruptive, the 
students’ First Amendment rights were not violated when their 
schools punished them for their off-campus online speech. 
However, because ours is not a society that generally sanitizes 
speech,  “the mere fact that someone might take offense to the 
content of the speech is not sufficient justification for prohibiting 
it.”245 Further, “not every off-hand reference to violence is a true 
threat unprotected by the First Amendment.”246 This distinction 
becomes particularly evident in comparing different sorts of 
violent student speech in the context of the school environment.247 
In Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton School District 53, the United 
States District Court for the District of Oregon analyzed violent 
comments a student made on his own Facebook page.248 Initially, 
the student posted that he wanted to start a petition to get his 
teacher fired, as “she’s the worst teacher ever.”249 After a friend 
asked why the student thought this, he responded “she’s just a 
bitch haha . . . she needs to be shot.”250 Though the posts were 
visible for less than one day, as the student’s mother, who 
monitored his Facebook account, had her son take them down,251 a 
parent of other children in the school anonymously turned a print 
out of the posts into the principal six weeks later.252 Following his 
three-and-one-half-day in-school suspension for his post, the 
student brought suit, alleging violation of his First Amendment 
rights.253 The District Court analyzed the language of the posts 
against the Ninth Circuit decision in Wynar v. Douglas County 
 
245 Burge ex rel. Burge v. Colton Sch. Dist. 53, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1063 (D. Or. 
2015) (quoting J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d 
Cir. 2011)). 
246 Id. at 1068. 
247 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that 
“schools can be places of special danger”). 
248 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057 (D. Or. 2015). 
249 Id. at 1060. 
250 Id. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 1061. 
253 Id. at 1060–61. 
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School District254 and found that “under Wynar, if [the student’s] 
off-campus comments constitute an ‘identifiable threat of school 
violence’ and would substantially disrupt or materially interfere 
with school activities, then [the school] could discipline him 
without violating the First Amendment.”255 Because “the Ninth 
Circuit did not explain in Wynar what constitutes ‘an identifiable 
threat of school violence,’” the district court looked to whether the 
school could reasonably foresee that the student’s comments would 
“materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.”256 
The student’s comments did not have “any impact on 
classroom activities.”257 There was no “widespread whispering 
campaign [at school], and [the post] was not discussed by students 
at school or anywhere else.”258 In fact, in the six weeks before the 
comments were brought to the attention of the school, “no one 
talked about or otherwise acknowledged them,”259 and the student 
continued to attend the class of the teacher he had posted about, in 
which there were “no disciplinary issues.”260 Further, unlike in 
Wynar, this student’s comments “were not explicitly violent and 
graphic,” he had no history of violent behavior, and had no access 
to weapons.261 Even once the school became aware of the posts, its 
“conduct evidenced no fear of future substantial disruption or 
violence.”262 Given these circumstances, the District Court 
deduced that “no reasonable fact-finder could conclude that [the 
student’s] Facebook comments were reasonably likely to cause the 
type of future substantial disruption required by Tinker” and the 
 
254 For discussion of Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Bd., 728 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2013), 
see supra notes 224–35 and accompanying text. 
255 Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1071. 
256 Id. at 1071–72 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 509 (1969)). 
257 Id. at 1072. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. at 1073. 
260 Id. 
261 Id. 
262 Id. 
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school had therefore violated his First Amendment rights by 
suspending him.263 
b) Harassing/Cyberbullying Speech 
Many posts in the cases courts have examined are violent or 
threatening, but still many more harass or bully other students 
without being violent. In Doninger v. Niehoff, the Second Circuit 
examined a student government member’s blog post that expressed 
discontent with the school’s scheduling of an extra-curricular event 
(a concert),264 and encouraged her peers to contact the 
“douchebags in central office” in order to express their grievances 
and “piss [them] off.”265  The student brought a suit claiming 
violation of her First Amendment rights after she was prevented 
from running for student government as a direct result of her 
post.266  Though the blog entry was posted off campus, it “directly 
pertained to events”267 at school, and by the student’s own 
admission  was meant “to encourage more people . . . to contact the 
administration.”268 The court concluded that because this post was 
“purposely designed by [the student] to come onto the campus,”269 
it was reasonably foreseeable that it would come to the attention of 
the administrators.270 Further, the court found that due to the 
student’s use of incendiary language, that she did not accurately 
inform her audience of issues surrounding the scheduling of the 
concert, and because rumors related to the post had “already begun 
to disrupt school activities,” it was reasonably foreseeable that this 
post would lead to a substantial disruption of the school 
environment.271 
Doninger addressed speech directed at school officials, but did 
not concern speech that one student posts about another. In 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, the Fourth Circuit addressed 
 
263 Id. at 1074. 
264 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008). 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 46–47. 
267 Id. at 50. 
268 Id. at 45. 
269 Id. at 50. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 50–51. 
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“a factual circumstance where student speech targeted classmates 
for verbal abuse,”272 in which a student created a Myspace page273 
that featured posts and photographs insinuating another named 
student had herpes, and invited one hundred of her peers to access 
and edit the page, which some did.274 In its analysis of the 
situation, the Fourth Circuit noted that “because, in Tinker the 
students’ wearing of the armbands ‘neither interrupted school 
activities nor sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of 
others,’ there was ‘no interference with work and no disorder’ to 
justify regulation of the speech.”275 Therefore, “the language of 
Tinker supports the conclusion that public schools have a 
‘compelling interest’ in regulating speech that interferes with or 
disrupts the work and discipline of the school, including discipline 
for student harassment and bullying.”276 The court further reasoned 
that though the student speaker posted this page from home, “she 
knew the electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published 
beyond her home and could reasonably be expected to reach the 
school or impact the school environment,” as she “also knew 
that . . . the fallout from her conduct and the speech within the 
[page] would be felt in the school itself.”277 Especially considering 
that the targeted student missed school to avoid her harassers,278  
this student’s speech was “materially and substantially disruptive 
in that it interfered with the schools’ work and collided with the 
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”279 
In contrast to the off-campus online speech that courts have 
found reasonably forecast as substantially disruptive of the school 
 
272 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 571 (4th Cir. 2011). 
273 Myspace is a “social networking site that allows its users to create webpages to 
interact with other users. Users of the service are able to create blogs, upload videos and 
photos, and design profiles to showcase their interests and talents. Myspace has provided 
a place for users to meet new friends and keep in touch with people the world.” Myspace, 
BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/Myspace.html 
[https://perma.cc/3WPD-YWV8] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
274 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. 
275 Id. at 572 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 
(1969)). 
276 Id. (citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 319–20 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
277 Id. at 573. 
278 Id. at 568. 
279 Id. at 573–74 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 513) (internal citations omitted). 
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environment and therefore constitutionally punishable,280 schools 
cannot, under Tinker, punish off-campus online speech that is not 
reasonably forecast to be or is not actually disruptive of the school 
environment.281 Though the Third Circuit is divided as to whether 
Tinker applies to off-campus online student speech,282 the court 
“assumed without deciding that Tinker applie[d]”283 to the facts of 
J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District.284 
In Snyder, a student was suspended for creating a fake 
Myspace profile of her principal285 that was obscene, nonsensical 
and though juvenile in nature, still deeply hurtful to the 
principal.286 However, the court noted that the profile was indeed 
so crude that it was neither realistically attributed to the principal, 
nor accepted as true.287 In determining the reasonableness of a 
forecasted substantial disruption of the school environment 
resulting from the profile, the court directly compared the facts of 
Tinker with the case at hand.288 The Snyder court noted that despite 
the fact that Tinker’s armbands “took the students’ minds off their 
classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly 
emotional subject of the Vietnam War,”289 the Tinker majority held 
that “‘the record does not demonstrate any facts which might 
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities,’ and 
thus that the school violated the students’ First Amendment 
 
280 See discussion supra Section II.C.1. 
281 See discussion supra Section II.C. 
282 See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219–20 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
283 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2011). 
284 Id. 
285 Id. at 920. 
286 Id. The profile “contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from 
nonsense and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the 
principal and his family.” Id. Notably, the principal’s wife was a guidance counselor at 
the same school. Id. at 921. 
287 Id. at 921. The court emphasized that, “though disturbing, the record indicates that 
the profile was so outrageous that no one took its content seriously.” Id. 
288 This is remarkable in that in most cases researched for this Note, the courts 
explained the facts of Tinker and used the Tinker standard and language, but did not 
directly compare those facts to the facts of the case at hand. 
289 Snyder, 650 F.3d at 928 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 518 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)). 
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rights”290 by punishing the students’ speech. Comparatively, 
“beyond general rumblings, a few minutes of talking in class, and 
some officials rearranging their schedules to assist [the principal] 
in dealing with the profile, no disruptions occurred” as a result of 
the student speech at issue in Snyder.291 Accordingly, the Third 
Circuit decided that “if Tinker’s black armbands—an ostentatious 
reminder of the highly emotional and controversial subject of the 
Vietnam war—could not reasonably have led school authorities to 
forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities, neither can [the Myspace] profile, despite the 
unfortunate humiliation it caused” for the principal.292   
2. Subject of Post 
Though the nature of the online post in question is an important 
consideration, courts have also evaluated the subject of the post in 
their determination of reasonable forecast of or actual substantial 
disruption. Often courts will consider the nature and subject of the 
post in tandem, since the nature of the post and the subject of the 
post can often be tied (as, for example, when a post threatens 
someone who is the speaker’s classmate). 
The “special characteristics of the school environment”293 may 
allow schools to regulate certain student speech in school that, if 
spoken outside of the school community would be protected by the 
First Amendment,294 however, the “point of all speech protection is 
to shield just those choices of content that in someone’s eyes are 
misguided, or even hurtful.”295 
Hence, the United States District Court for the District of 
Minnesota reasoned in Sagehorn v. Independent School District 
 
290 Id. at 929 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514 (emphasis in original)). 
291 Id. at 929. 
292 Id. at 929–30. 
293 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. 
294 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 689 (1986) (noting that “if [the 
student] had given the same speech outside of the school environment, he could not have 
been penalized simply because government officials considered his language to be 
inappropriate”). 
295 Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 855 (D. Minn. 2015) 
(citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011)). 
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No. 728296 that  even if a student’s off-campus online speech is 
“inappropriate, ill-advised, and offensive,”297 a school may only 
punish the speech if it “is both (1) reasonably calculated to reach 
the school environment and (2) so egregious as to pose a serious 
safety risk or other substantial disruption in that environment.”298 
The court further noted that “this is an extremely high bar,” as 
courts have found this standard satisfied in only “the most violent 
and threatening forms of speech,” “consistently declining to 
expand it to extremely offensive but nonviolent out-of-school 
speech.”299  
At issue in Sagehorn was an anonymous post on a website 
entitled “[High School Name] Confessions,” that asked “did [a 
certain student] actually make out with [name of female teacher at 
the High School]?”300 The student in question replied, “actually 
yes,” which he later stated he intended as a joke.301 A parent of 
another student at the high school soon contacted the school about 
the posts, and the student was suspended for “damag[ing] a 
teacher’s reputation.”302 The court discussed that though some may 
interpret the phrase “make out” to connote sexual intercourse,303 
the term “is slang that certainly has varying meanings, including 
connotations not involving sexual intercourse.”304 In fact, nothing 
in either the question posted or the given response or “other 
allegations in the complaint suggest that [the student] was using 
the term to mean sexual intercourse.”305 Further, “even if the Court 
were to find that [the student’s] post unambiguously referred to 
sexual intercourse, the content actually attributable to [him]—a 
response of ‘actually yes’—is not nearly as graphic as the content 
 
296 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. Minn. 2015). 
297 Id. at 855. 
298 Id. at 857 (emphasis in original). 
299 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
300 Id. at 849. 
301 Id. 
302 Id. 
303 Id. at 853. 
304 Id. at 854. 
305 Id. 
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courts have found obscene as a matter of law.”306 The court noted 
that “the fact that speech references teacher-on-student sexual 
conduct does not, de facto, make the speech likely to reach the 
school and cause a substantial disruption,”307 and further, that even 
if the court “assumed, without deciding, that [the student’s] post 
was intended to reach the school environment, there is no 
indication that any disruption was, in fact, caused by [the 
student’s] post.”308 In the absence of such a disruption, Tinker does 
not allow the school to punish the student for his off-campus 
online speech.309 
Similarly, the student speech at issue in Snyder310 directly 
attacked the school principal and his wife, who was one of the 
school’s guidance counselors.311 The student who made the fake 
Myspace profile of the principal claimed it was meant “to be a joke 
between herself and her friends,”312 and despite the fact that the 
profile personally attacked the principal, a guidance counselor, and 
their family in crude, vulgar, and profane manner,313 the court 
found that the profile “was so juvenile and nonsensical that no 
reasonable person could take its content seriously, and the record 
clearly demonstrates that no one did.”314 Accordingly, the court 
 
306 Id. at 854 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 854–55 (citing Rosario v. Clark Cty. 
Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 3679375 (D. Nev. July 3, 2013)) (discussing an example of a legally 
obscene student tweet). 
307 Id. at 858. 
308 Id. “Based on the allegations in the complaint, there was no commotion, boisterous 
conduct, interruption of classes, or any lack of order, discipline and decorum at the 
school, as a result of [the speaker’s] posting of ‘actually yes’ on the Internet.” Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
309 Id. at 859. 
310 See supra notes 284–93 and accompanying text. 
311 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920–21 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
312 Id. at 921. But see id. at 948 n.5 (Fisher, J., dissenting) (opining, “even if [the 
speaker]’s intent were at issue, it is not so clear that the profile was intended to be a joke. 
While she at one point stated that the profile was created for comical reasons, [the 
speaker] also stated that she created the profile because she was ‘mad’ at [the principal] 
for disciplining her. She claimed [the principal] unnecessarily yelled at her for 
committing dress code violations. It is therefore fair to say that [the speaker] created the 
profile in retaliation.”). 
313 Id. at 920. 
314 Id. at 929. 
2019] THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER 405 
 
decided that the school violated the student’s First Amendment 
rights by suspending her for speech that neither caused nor could 
have been forecast to cause a substantial disruption in school,315 
“despite the unfortunate humiliation it caused” for the principal.316 
In contrast to the cases in this Section that involved student off-
campus online speech targeting teachers,317 the Fourth Circuit 
examined a case involving student off-campus online speech that 
attacked a classmate. In Kowalski, the court decided that a 
Myspace page on which the student speaker opened up for 
discussion unfounded rumors of another student’s sexual history318 
was a “hate website”319 “created for the purpose of inviting others 
to indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct which caused an in-
school disruption.”320 The court determined that the “targeted, 
defamatory nature of [the speech], aimed at a fellow classmate” 
created an “‘actual or nascent’ substantial disruption in the 
school,”321 and that “because [the] speech interfered with the work 
and discipline of the school,” the speaker’s First Amendment rights 
were not violated when she was punished for her speech.322 In its 
decision, the court indicated that schools “have a duty to protect 
their students from harassment and bullying in the school 
environment,”323 and further reasoned that unlike a situation in 
which “school authorities ‘suppress speech on political and social 
issues based on disagreement with the viewpoint expressed,’ 
school administrators must be able to prevent and punish 
 
315 Id. at 925. 
316 Id. at 930. 
317 See generally id.; Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842 (D. 
Minn. 2015). 
318 See supra notes 273–80 and accompanying text. 
319 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 568 (4th Cir. 2011). 
320 Id. at 567 (citations omitted). 
321 Id. at 574 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 
513 (1969)). 
322 Id. at 574. 
323 Id. at 572 (Alito, J., concurring) (stipulating in full that, “just as schools have a 
responsibility to provide a safe environment for students free from messages advocating 
illegal drug use, schools have a duty to protect their students from harassment and 
bullying in the school environment.” (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007))). 
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harassment and bullying in order to provide a safe school 
environment conducive to learning.”324 
Because educators must be able to maintain a safe environment 
for their students not only psychologically but also physically, 
speech that violently or threateningly targets specific teachers, 
students, or the school community as a whole is largely punishable 
by school authorities.325 
3. Privacy or Publicity of Post 
The standard governing school regulation of off-campus online 
student speech is in part so pliable because similar posts can have 
different meanings/effects based on the platform to which the 
student posts the content and the privacy settings the speaker 
chooses for her post, in addition to the nature and subject of the 
post as discussed above.326 Many courts that have addressed the 
issue have not analyzed the social media platform to which the 
student speaker posted online from off campus, and whether a post 
reaches the school community is not necessarily demonstrative of 
its causing a substantial disruption at school.327 However, some 
courts have considered the privacy settings or lack thereof these 
student speakers chose for the posts in question as a factor of a 
reasonable forecast of substantial disruption of the school 
environment.328 
When the Third Circuit decided in Synder329 that the fake 
Myspace profile of a school principal the student posted was not 
 
324 Id.  
325 See supra Section II.C.1.a (discussing violent/threatening speech). This analysis is to 
a great extent inextricable from the analysis of violent/threatening speech discussed supra 
Section II.C.1.a, and is therefore not discussed at length in this Section, but is an 
important consideration of courts examining the subject of a student’s online post. 
326 See supra Sections II.C.1–II.C.2. 
327 See Sagehorn v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 728, 122 F. Supp. 3d 842, 857 (D. Minn. 
2015) (noting, “[t]he fact that a statement may have been reasonably calculated to reach a 
school audience is not sufficient: school officials must also show that the statements 
posed a substantial disruptive effect.” (citing R.S. ex rel. S.S. v. Minnewaska Area Sch. 
Dist., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (D. Minn. 2012))). 
328 See discussion infra Section II.C.3. 
329 See supra notes 284–93 and accompanying text. 
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reasonably forecast as substantially disruptive,330 it considered the 
steps that the speaker took to make the Myspace page available 
only to a limited audience.331 The court weighed the fact that the 
speaker’s post was at first viewable “in full by anyone who knew 
the URL (or address) or who otherwise found the profile by 
searching MySpace for a term it contained,”332 against the fact that 
the day after the page’s creation, the speaker “made the profile 
‘private’ after several students approached her at school, generally 
to say that they thought the profile was funny.”333 The court 
reasoned that these actions evidenced that the speaker “did not 
even intend for the speech to reach the school—in fact, she took 
specific steps to make the profile ‘private’ so that only her friends 
could access it,” and further, that “the fact that her friends happen 
to be [students of the same school] is not surprising, and does not 
mean that [her] speech targeted the school.”334 
While the Snyder court focused on how many people were 
excluded from the Myspace page targeting a principal, the 
Kowalski court emphasized the communal nature of a Myspace 
page attacking a student. The Fourth Circuit found in Kowalski335 
that a student-created Myspace page that “functioned as a platform 
for [the speaker] and her friends to direct verbal attacks towards [a] 
classmate”336 was reasonably forecast as substantially 
disruptive.337 The creator of the page invited approximately one 
hundred of her Myspace “friends”338 to access the page, which 
allowed them to “respond to text, comments, and photographs in 
an interactive fashion,” and eventually more than two dozen of her 
classmates did so.339 The students involved with the Myspace page 
likely knew their speech would not be kept private, as the Court 
 
330 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 925 (3d Cir. 2011). 
331 Id. at 921. 
332 Id. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. at 930–31. 
335 See supra notes 273–80 and accompanying text; see also notes 319–25 and 
accompanying text. 
336 Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 572–73 (4th Cir. 2011). 
337 Id. at 574. 
338   See supra note 30 (explaining what it means to be a “friend” or “follower” of 
someone on social media).   
339 Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. 
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noted that one student remarked, “wait til [the target of the speech] 
sees the page lol.”340 Given that both the participants in and the 
target of the page were students of the same high school,341 the 
Court found it foreseeable that this  “hate website”342 would reach 
the school community “via computers, smartphones, and other 
electronic devices”343 and “create a reasonably foreseeable 
substantial disruption there.”344 
The Second Circuit has similarly found that the publicity of a 
post can factor into a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption 
of the school.345 In Wisniewski,346 the court examined a post that 
threatened a teacher and that was visible to fifteen of the speaker’s 
friends, some of whom were also his classmates, for three 
weeks,347 and ultimately determined that such “excessive 
distribution” contributed to the reasonable foreseeability, if not 
inevitability, of the post causing substantial disruption in the 
school.348 
Some courts consider not only the size of the speaker’s 
audience in this regard, but also whether the speaker purposely 
directed his speech at the school when determining whether a 
forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable or if a disruption 
occurred. In deciding that a student’s rap recording that threatened 
teachers disrupted the school environment,349 the Fifth Circuit 
noted that the speech in Bell350 “pertained directly to events 
occurring at school,”351 and that the speaker “admitted he intended 
the speech to be public and reach members of the school 
 
340 Id. at 573. Note that “lol” is Internet shorthand for “laugh[ing] out loud.” Id. at 568. 
341 Id.  at 573, 574, 576–77. 
342 Id. at 568. 
343 Id. at 574. 
344 Id. 
345 Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008); see also Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
346 See supra notes 205–11 and accompanying text. 
347 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 36. 
348 Id. at 39–40. 
349 Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 399–400 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
350 See supra notes 236–45 and accompanying text. 
351 Bell, 799 F.3d at 398. 
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community, which is further evidenced by his posting the 
recording to Facebook and YouTube.”352 Likewise, the Second 
Circuit considered the fact that a speaker’s blog post was 
“purposely designed by [the speaker] to come onto the campus,”353 
that the post “directly pertained to events at [the high school],” and 
that the speaker’s “intent in writing it was specifically to encourage 
her fellow students to read and respond”354 when it decided that a 
student’s blog post was foreseeably substantially disruptive of the 
school environment.355 
In summary, though the First Amendment guarantees free 
speech to American citizens, this right is not absolute, and is 
qualified in limited circumstances by legitimate government 
interests in speech restriction.356 Consequently, the Supreme Court 
has found that a school may regulate student speech that is (1) 
foreseeably or actually substantially disruptive of the school 
environment or that invades the rights of others,357 (2) offensive, 
indecent, or lewd,358 (3) of pedagogical concern,359 or (4) promotes 
the use of illegal drugs, even if the speech occurs off campus in a 
school-sponsored activity.360 
The standard governing off-campus online student speech, 
however, is less straight-forward. Because no two student posts or 
the circumstances surrounding the posts are exactly alike, and 
because it is not definitively established that Tinker and its 
progeny361 apply to these cases in the first place,362 there are many 
 
352 Id. at 399. 
353 Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008). 
354 Id. at 50 (internal citations omitted).  
355 Id. at 53. 
356 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
357 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
358 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
359 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
360 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); see also discussion supra Section 
II.B (examining the Tinker standard and its progeny (Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse, 
respectively)). 
361 See, Morse, 551 U.S. 393; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260; Fraser, 474 U.S. 814. 
362 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 393 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016) (explaining that “of the six circuits to have addressed whether 
Tinker applies to off-campus speech, five . . . have held it does. (For the other of the six 
circuits (the third circuit), there is an intra-circuit split . . . ) . . . [t]he remainder of the 
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factors to consider in determining whether a student’s off-campus 
online speech could foreseeably cause or actually did cause a 
substantial disruption of the school environment. It may seem that 
courts vary widely in their considerations,363 however, their 
evaluations are more easily compared by organizing them into 
analytical categories based the nature of the speech, the subject of 
the speech, and the privacy of the speech as discussed above in this 
Part. Tinker’s complicated application to these cases may have 
made sense at one time, but no longer accommodates the realities 
of the current nature, use, and presence of the internet in daily 
American life. 
III. IS STUDENT SPEECH SUFFICIENTLY FREE? 
A. School Regulation of Student Speech Allows Educators to 
Shape Adolescent Understanding of Appropriate Behavior 
Some opponents of the jurisprudence surrounding Tinker’s 
application to off-campus online student speech argue not 
necessarily that Tinker is the wrong standard, but rather that 
schools should have no ability to control student speech that occurs 
outside of the school environment.364 But to limit a school’s ability 
to regulate student speech based on the physical boundaries of the 
schoolyard would be to ignore the “somewhat ‘everywhere at 
once’ nature of the internet”365 and the realities of our hyper-
connected digital world. 
Even before the internet allowed for easy communication 
between individuals or to immeasurable audiences at all times of 
 
circuits . . . do not appear to have addressed this issue.”) The Supreme Court of the 
United States denied certiorari to Bell in 2016. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 136 S. Ct. 
1166 (2016)). 
363 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
364 E.g.,  J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936–40 (3d Cir. 
2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (arguing that Tinker should not apply to off-campus speech, 
as “the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same 
extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large,” and that applying Tinker 
to off-campus speech “would empower schools to regulate students’ expressive activity 
no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so 
long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”). 
365 Id. at 940 (Smith, J., concurring). 
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day and night, the Supreme Court had “clearly stated that the rights 
of free speech and assembly ‘do not mean that everyone with 
opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public 
place at any time.’”366 In truth, no person carries with him into a 
Church, or a Synagogue, for example, or  into “the United States 
Senate or House, or into the Supreme Court, or any other court, a 
complete constitutional right to go into those places contrary to 
their rules and speak his mind on any subject he pleases.”367 It 
follows that a student has no absolute right to contravene school 
rules with his speech at school. The question is, then, whether a 
school should be able to extend its control over a student to his off-
campus online speech. 
Though students and teachers do not “shed their constitutional 
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate,”368 the Supreme Court recognizes the need for 
“comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, 
consistent with fundamental conditional safeguards, to prescribe 
and control conduct in the schools.”369 This is a difficult, though 
absolutely necessary, balance to strike, and one that is only 
complicated by our increasingly-interconnected world. The courts 
that have addressed this issue do not all agree as to what sort of 
off-campus online speech is reasonably foreseen to be or is 
actually disruptive of the school environment,370 but those that 
have applied Tinker to the speech at issue371 have correctly 
determined that a school must have some role to play in the 
regulation of off-campus online student speech. 
Usually, “when the ‘First Amendment is implicated, the tie 
goes to the speaker.’”372 However, because “the relationship 
 
366 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965)). 
367 Id. at 521–22 (Black, J., dissenting). 
368 Id. at 506; see also discussion supra Sections II.A–II.B. 
369 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
370 See generally supra Part II. 
371 See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
372 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 445 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Fed. 
Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 474 (2007)). In the original 
Wisconsin Right to Life opinion, the full sentence reads, “Where the First Amendment is 
implicated, the tie goes to the speaker, not the censor.” 551 U.S. at 474. 
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between schools and students ‘is custodial and tutelary, permitting 
a degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised 
over free adults,’ it might well be appropriate to tolerate some 
targeted viewpoint discrimination in th[e] unique setting [of the 
school].”373 School officials stand in loco parentis374 when 
students are entrusted to their care, and courts have therefore 
“upheld the right of schools to discipline students, to enforce rules, 
and to maintain order.”375 Like parents, school officials, “knowing 
that  adolescents often test the boundaries of acceptable behavior, 
may believe it is important (for the offending student and his 
classmates) to establish when a student has gone too far.”376 
Authority figures like parents and teachers have always determined 
what sort of conduct is appropriate for children because, in many 
ways, adults help guide children through situations that they are 
not yet equipped to navigate themselves. As Justice Black noted, 
“taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age 
they need to learn, not teach.”377 Though their voices should be 
heard, schoolchildren are not necessarily ready to decide for 
themselves what sort of behavior is appropriate in a given setting. 
Regulating student online speech is not akin to prior restraint, but 
rather helps students learn “the boundaries of acceptable 
behavior”378 from their mistakes. 
 
373 Morse, 551 U.S. at 439 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (citation omitted)). 
374 Meaning, “in the place of a parent.” In loco parentis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
(5th ed. 2016). See generally Morse, 551 U.S. at 413–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(discussing the doctrine of in loco parentis in the context of the history of American 
public schools). But see id. at 424 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that “most parents, 
realistically, have no choice but to send their children to a public school and little ability 
to influence what occurs in the school. It is therefore wrong to treat public school 
officials, for purposes relevant to the First Amendment, as if they were private, 
nongovernmental actors standing in loco parentis.”). 
375 Morse, 551 U.S. at 413 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
376 Id. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
377 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting). 
378 Morse, 551 U.S. at 427 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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B. But a Determination of Whether Speech Is Appropriate Cannot 
Depend Solely on the Reactions of the Listeners 
While schools must have some ability to regulate off-campus 
online student speech,379 the courts to have addressed the issue380 
have erred in applying Tinker to such speech. Not only is the 
Tinker substantial disruption assessment the incorrect standard by 
which to evaluate whether off-campus online student speech 
requires a school’s intervention, but it also should not apply to this 
speech because courts cannot agree on how to consistently apply 
it.381 
The Tinker substantial disruption standard should not govern 
off-campus online student speech because whether a school can 
regulate a student’s post should not be based on the likelihood that 
the post will cause or actually does cause a substantial disruption 
of the school environment. To begin, the school environment is not 
necessarily at its base level disturbance-free. Even “[a]dults often 
say things that give rise to disruptions in public schools. Those 
who championed desegregation in the 1950s and 60s caused more 
than a minor disturbance in the southern schools.”382 If a classroom 
is to be the “marketplace of ideas”383 that we cherish as Americans, 
we cannot attempt to snuff out discussions of uncomfortable social 
and political issues under the guise of necessarily quelling 
disturbance of the school environment. 
What’s more, “absence of evidence [of disturbance] is not 
evidence of absence [of disturbance].”384 The Tinker Court held 
that because the speakers “neither interrupted school activities nor 
sought to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others,” the 
school could not constitutionally punish their speech.385 However, 
 
379 See supra Section III.A. 
380 See supra note 363 and accompanying text. 
381 See discussion supra Section II.C (examining the current standard (or lack thereof) 
governing school regulation of student speech posted online from off campus). 
382 J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring). 
383 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). 
384 See Fred Shapiro, The Absence of Proof, FREAKANOMICS (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://freakonomics.com/2011/09/29/the-absence-of-proof/ [https://perma.cc/9SCW-
3ZS4]. 
385 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514. 
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in truth, “even a casual reading of the record shows that this 
armband did divert students’ minds from their regular lessons,” 
and that even if the school environment was not substantially 
disrupted, “the record overwhelmingly shows that the armbands 
did exactly what the [school] foresaw they would, that is, took the 
students’ minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts 
about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war.”386 This 
Note does not argue that Tinker was wrongly decided, but rather 
highlights the actual disturbance that resulted from the speech in 
Tinker to emphasize that a lack of substantial disruption does not 
equate to a serene learning environment. The Tinker standard, 
therefore, is not infallible. 
In allowing a substantial disruption, or lack thereof, to dictate 
whether a school can punish a student’s off-campus online speech, 
courts fail to address conduct that significantly disrupts the school 
environment of at least one student, if not of the student body en 
masse. It cannot be said that the free speech rights of one child 
outweigh another child’s need for a safe learning environment, as 
school officials often intervene in student conflicts at school. In 
fact, the Tinker majority decreed that student conduct “in class or 
out of it, which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, 
or type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork or involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, 
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
speech.”387 Though the Court explicitly recognized the “rights of 
other students to be secure and to be let alone,”388 this prong of the 
Tinker standard is perplexingly largely overlooked by lower courts 
and seldom cited to justify the regulation of off-campus online 
student speech.389 
 
386 Id. at 518 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Snyder, 650 F.3d at 946 (Fisher, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “[t]he majority also overlooks the substantial disruptions to the 
classroom environment that follow from personal and harmful attacks on educators and 
school officials.”). 
387 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). 
388 Id. at 508. 
389 See generally supra Section II.C (discussing the current standard (or lack thereof) 
governing school regulation of student speech posted online from off campus). 
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If school officials could not regulate student speech that 
disrupted a few other students’ learning environments but caused 
no substantial disruption of the school, it would be challenging for 
school officials to regulate bullying in their halls. There is 
disagreement as to whether a school or a parent can best handle 
punishment of cyberbullying.390 Yet, as an employee can complain 
of harassment or a hostile work environment to the human 
resources department of his company, so too should a student be 
able to lodge similar complaints to the authority common to both 
the student and his harasser: the school.391 A victim of 
cyberbullying should not suffer in silence because the bully’s off-
campus online speech was not sufficiently disruptive of the school 
environment for the school to intervene.392 A court should instead 
be able to find that a school is authorized to punish cyberbullying 
as conflicting with the rights of other students to be let alone.393 
 
390 Although definitions vary, “cyber harassment is often understood to involve the 
intentional infliction of substantial emotional distress accomplished by online speech that 
is persistent enough to amount to a ‘course of conduct’ rather than an isolated incident.” 
CITRON, supra note 38, at 3. Cyber harassment or bullying may also involve “threats of 
violence, privacy invasions, reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically 
harm victims, and technological attacks.” Id. 
391 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining 
“as the [speaker] could anticipate, [the target of the off-campus online student speech] 
and her parents took the attack as having been made in the school context, as they went to 
the high school to lodge their complaint.”). 
392 Note: regardless of a school’s ability to punish certain off-campus online student 
speech, “[s]chools are increasingly involved in helping parents and students learn about 
online safety. Some school districts have adopted cyber bullying curricula to obtain 
federal funds earmarked for technology or to comply with state laws requiring ‘character 
education’ in public schools. Their impetus has ethical roots as well. As the Supreme 
Court has underscored, schools nurture the ‘habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government.’” CITRON, supra note 38, at 248 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)). 
393 In Kowalski, the student who was the target of the off-campus online speech 
reported the harassment to the school (Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573), then “left the school 
with her parents, as she did not want to attend classes that day, feeling uncomfortable 
about sitting in class with students who had posted comments about her on the MySpace 
webpage [at issue].” Id. at 568. Though this post clearly “colli[ded] with the rights of 
[this student] to be secure and to be let alone,” Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, the court 
mystifyingly concluded “that the school was authorized to discipline [the speaker] 
because her speech interfered with the work and discipline of the school,” Kowalski, 652 
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Though it is possible a cyberbully might be punished under the 
Tinker substantial disruption standard,394 courts have been unable 
to agree on what sort of cyber speech is substantially disruptive. As 
discussed in Part II, online student speech, as any other sort of 
speech, varies greatly by chosen platform,395 topic, and audience. 
These variables, coupled with the lack of clarity surrounding 
Tinker’s applicability to off-campus online speech in the first 
place, leave schools to consider a great many factors and exercise a 
great deal of discretion in deciding whether to punish a student’s 
off-campus online speech.396 
Courts examine broad categories of similar factors, as 
organized and discussed in Part II of this Note, but do not 
necessarily each examine the exact same factors in every case. 
That courts do not agree on what sort of speech will be reasonably 
forecast as or actually disruptive of the school environment397 
when examining the speech at issue in these broad analytical 
categories indicates that the deciding legal test is impossibly 
subjective. So much of the standard lies within the judges’ 
discretion that a student speaker cannot be certain of just what sort 
of off-campus online speech will subject him to constitutional 
school punishment, save for perhaps the certainty that violent 
and/or threatening speech seems to be somewhat more consistently 
regulated than other speech examined.398 A student cannot know 
with any certainty whether his school can generally regulate his 
off-campus online speech, and thus might find that his best course 
of action is to refrain from speaking at all.399 This standard, 
 
F.3d at 574, and did not address the rights-of-students-to-be-let-alone prong of the Tinker 
standard. 
394 See supra note 394 and accompanying text. 
395 It is worth noting that though chosen platform might seem to be its own category of 
evaluation for courts, this should not be the case, or a student could possibly be punished 
for posting something on Instagram, e.g., but not for posting the same thing on Twitter or 
Snapchat. 
396 See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 398 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 
136 S. Ct. 1166 (2016). 
397 See generally supra Part II. 
398 See generally supra Section II.C. 
399 The Vagueness Doctrine is a constitutional principle that requires “fair notice of 
what is punishable and what is not . . . [to] prevent arbitrary enforcement of the laws.” 
Wex Legal Dictionary & Encyclopedia, Vagueness Doctrine, LEGAL INFORMATION 
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therefore, effectively chills off-campus online student speech and 
silences young American speakers. 
While it is “a myth to say that any person has a constitutional 
right to say what he pleases, where he pleases, and when he 
pleases,”400 it is also true that “[w]hen First Amendment rights are 
at stake, a rule that ‘sweep[s] in a great variety of conduct under a 
general and indefinite characterization’ may not leave ‘too wide a 
discretion in its application,’”401 as the Tinker standard does when 
applied to off-campus online student speech. Though Tinker in its 
original application remains good law, the vagueness of this rule as 
adapted and applied to modern off-campus online student speech 
simply cannot pass constitutional muster, because “our 
jurisprudence now says that students have a right to speak in 
schools except when they do not.”402 
Justice Clarence Thomas believes that Tinker itself is 
unconstitutional403 because in his view, “the history of public 
education suggests that the First Amendment, as originally 
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”404 
This fundamentally cannot be the case, for while “the original idea 
of schools . . . was that children had not yet reached the point of 
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their 
elders,”405 it is also generally accepted that “the Nation has 
outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are to be seen not 
 
INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/vagueness_doctrine [https://perma.cc
/KTQ4-3V8E] (last visited Nov. 6, 2018). A statute is “also void for vagueness if a 
legislature’s delegation of authority to judges and/or administrators is so extensive that it 
would lead to arbitrary prosecutions.” Id. Though generally applied towards criminal 
laws, the principles of the vagueness doctrine are just as relevant to the issue of school 
punishment of off-campus online student speech. 
400 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 522 (1969) (Black, J., 
dissenting); see also supra Section II.A. 
401 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 440–41 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)). 
402 Id. at 418 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
403 Id. at 410. 
404 Id. at 410–11. Thomas also observes that “[t]he Tinker Court made little attempt to 
ground its holding in the history of education or in the original understanding of the First 
Amendment,” Id. at 420, and argues that Tinker itself has no basis in the Constitution. Id. 
at 410–22. 
405 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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heard.’”406 Today, “public school conveys to our young the 
information and tools required not merely to survive in, but to 
contribute to, civilized society.”407 To be sure, “[s]chool discipline, 
like parental discipline, is an integral and important part of training 
our children to be good citizens—to be better citizens.”408 To 
silence children absolutely cannot possibly be the best way to 
prepare them to become contributing members of civilized society. 
It is therefore necessary not only to maintain the First 
Amendment’s general application to student speech in public 
school settings, but also to recognize that the First Amendment 
rights of a public-school student are subject to limitation, and in so 
doing protect a school’s tutelary role in a student’s life. 
The four main authorities governing the regulation of student 
speech on school grounds or in school-sponsored activities are 
well-established law.409 Though times have noticeably changed in 
the years since these cases were decided, this Note does not 
challenge the general applicability of this precedent to cases of in-
school or school-sponsored student speech today. Rather, this Note 
disputes that Tinker and its progeny can or should be applied, 
unmodified, to cases of off-campus online student speech that arise 
in the context of our interconnected, social-media-obsessed world 
today. Courts have correctly recognized a school’s need to be able 
to control its environment in painstakingly applying Tinker to off-
campus online student speech.410 However, because the Tinker 
standard does not accurately encompass the realities of the internet 
and its place in an American student’s life, courts inadvertently 
conduct haphazard Tinker analyses in off-campus online student 
speech cases that result in unpredictable outcomes. Consequently, 
Tinker must be replaced as the governing standard in these cases. 
 
406 Id.  
407 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988). 
408 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (Black, J., dissenting). 
409 See supra Sections II.A–II.B, discussing First Amendment caselaw generally, and 
Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, and Morse. 
410 See supra Sections II.A–II.C. 
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IV. INSTEAD, TINKER WITH TINKER 
Tinker cannot be the standard governing a school’s ability to 
punish off-campus online student speech because it is too 
inconsistently applied. Instead, this Note advocates for a solution 
that leads to more predictable outcomes and proposes that the 
standard governing these cases should be a modified version of the 
Tinker test. Student speech that is posted online from off campus 
should be subject to punishment by school officials if that speech 
(1) touches and concerns the school community or a member of the 
school community, and if that speech (2) interferes with the rights 
of members of the school community “to be secure and to be let 
alone.”411 This is a two-pronged test, meaning that both elements 
of the test must be met if the student is to be constitutionally 
punished by the school for her off-campus online speech. 
Therefore, if the off-campus online speech in question does not 
touch and concern the school, school officials cannot punish the 
student for that speech. Likewise, even if the off-campus online 
speech touches and concerns the school, if it does not interfere 
with the rights of other members of the school community to be 
secure and let alone, the school cannot punish that speech. 
The idea that speech should touch and concern the school to 
come under the school’s jurisdiction springs from the property law 
principal that a covenant should touch and concern the benefitted 
or burdened land. In property law, a covenant touches and 
concerns the land if executing that covenant affects what happens 
on the land at issue.412 In the same vein, student speech would 
touch and concern the school if that speech affects what happens at 
school. The school could use the three broad analytical categories 
discussed in Part II to determine whether the student’s off-campus 
online speech touches and concerns the school. That is, the school 
could consider the (1) nature of the post, (2) subject of the post, 
and (3) audience of the post in making this decision. If in 
evaluating these three aspects of the post the school determines 
 
411 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
412 Alan R. Romero, Deciding Whether a Covenant Touches and Concerns the Land, 
DUMMIES, http://www.dummies.com/education/law/deciding-whether-a-covenant-
touches-and-concerns-the-relevant-land/ [https://perma.cc/RPE6-BH8B] (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2018). 
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that the post touches and concerns the school, the post would fall 
under the school’s jurisdiction, and the school could then punish 
the speaker as if the speech had occurred at school if the school 
also finds that the speech interfered with the rights of others to be 
secure and let alone. No one of these three analytical categories 
would be determinative; rather, the schools would weigh all of the 
criteria considered in its evaluation. The schools would not be 
weighing these factors to determine whether the speech caused a 
reasonable forecast of or actual disturbance, as is the current 
practice, but rather weigh the factors to determine whether the 
speech touches and concerns the school community in the first 
place. 
Further, the “general right of the individual to be let alone,” is 
much “like the right not to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to 
be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, [and] the 
right not to be defamed.”413 Underlying each of these individual 
rights is “in reality not the principle of private property, but that of 
an inviolate personality.”414 That is, every man has a right to be 
respected and secure in his person. This right may not be 
trespassed upon by a student asserting his freedom of speech. The 
standard that this Note proposes protects the rights of not only 
other students to be let alone, but all members of the school 
community, including faculty and staff. This ensures that a post 
maliciously attacking a teacher or other school official, for 
example, would not slip through the cracks because it did not 
interfere with the rights of other students to be let alone. 
Moreover, off-campus online speech that touches and concerns 
the school community is not punishable simply because it also 
breaks a school rule. Rather, that post must touch and concern the 
school community and interfere with the rights of others to be let 
alone for the school to constitutionally punish it. This distinction 
allows the off-campus online student speech that is truly of the 
school’s concern to fall under school authority, while 
acknowledging that the speaker was not in a school setting when 
 
413 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
205 (1890). 
414 Id. 
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he spoke. To permit the school to punish, in all cases,  the student 
speaking online from off campus exactly as if she had spoken at 
school would be to install an authoritarian regime that exercises 
control over students in all places and at all times.415 Instead, the 
proposed standard requires the student’s off-campus online speech 
not only touch and concern the school community, but also 
interfere with the rights of others to be let alone if the school is to 
punish that speech to ensure that schools are only able to punish 
speech that is truly of pedagogical concern. 
To illustrate the nuances of the proposed standard, consider 
this: if a student posted something online from off campus that 
mocked a student from another school, the speaker’s school would 
examine the nature, subject, and audience of the post, and likely 
determine that the post did not touch and concern the school. The 
speaker therefore could not be punished by his school for that post. 
In contrast, if the speaker’s post mocked a classmate or teacher at 
his own school, the school would likely determine that the post 
touched and concerned the school, and the post would fall under 
the school’s jurisdiction. If the school then found that the post 
interfered with the rights of other members of the school 
community to be let alone, the school could punish the speaker as 
if he had spoken at school. If a student mocked a teacher by 
discussing her personal life,416 for example, he could likely be 
 
415 J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 936–40 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(Smith, J., concurring) (arguing that Tinker should not apply to off-campus speech, as 
“the First Amendment protects students engaging in off-campus speech to the same 
extent it protects speech by citizens in the community at large,” and that applying Tinker 
to off-campus speech “would empower schools to regulate students’ expressive activity 
no matter where it takes place, when it occurs, or what subject matter it involves—so 
long as it causes a substantial disruption at school.”). 
416 See generally Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d 
Cir. 2011); Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930. Both cases involve fake Myspace profiles made of 
principals, and are good examples of personal attacks on teachers that are not well-
reasoned, legitimate protests of those principal’s policies or practices. This does not mean 
to suggest that certain speech is more legitimate than others; rather, that certain speech is 
appropriate to broadcast to a wide audience (e.g., speech protesting a school policy), and 
certain speech should be subject to punishment in order to teach children the boundaries 
of socially appropriate behavior. Mocking a teacher for no other reason than to do so 
interferes with his right to be let alone personally, and is not a legitimate challenge to his 
position as an authority figure (in which role he has less right to be let alone, because 
authority figures generally should not go unchecked in our society). 
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punished for violating her right to be let alone. But if that student 
had spoken out against a teacher’s practice in an informed, 
reasoned way, that student would likely not be punished, assuming 
the school allows for the legitimate criticism of authority that is 
essential to a functioning democracy. 
This Note directs those who might take issue with any given 
school punishment of an off-campus online student post to an idea 
from Justice Harlan’s Tinker dissent.  If the school can show that it 
punished the post only after it found that the post both (1) touched 
and concerned the school, and (2) interfered with the rights of 
other members of the school community to be secure and let alone, 
the student challenging the punishment would have “the burden of 
showing that a particular school measure was motivated by other 
than legitimate pedagogical concerns—for example, a desire to 
prohibit the expression of an unpopular point of view, while 
permitting expression of the dominant opinion.”417 
Had the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School known of 
Nikolas Cruz’s post indicating his intent to become “a professional 
school shooter”418 before the events of that fateful February day,419 
it might have applied this proposed standard to determine whether 
to take action against Cruz. In so doing, the school would first 
determine whether the post touched and concerned the school 
community by evaluating the nature, subject, and audience of the 
post. The post is clearly violent in nature, and reasonably 
understood as directed towards the school the speaker attended.420 
Additionally, the speaker made no attempts to conceal his message 
as he posted it in the public comments of a YouTube video.421 
Taking all three of these factors into consideration, the speaker’s 
school could reasonably determine that his post falls into its 
jurisdiction, and would thus apply the second prong of the 
 
417 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting). 
418 Apel, supra note 7. 
419 Assuming he was still a student at this point. See supra notes 1–10 and 
accompanying text. 
420 Or previously attended. This analysis assumes he was still a student at Marjory 
Stoneman Douglas High School at this point, which would be required for the school to 
punish him. 
421 Apel, supra note 7. 
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proposed standard to his speech. The post interferes with the rights 
of other students to be alone in that it is reasonably understood to 
threaten the school community. Students are not free to learn in 
peace if they have reason to fear for their lives while at school. 
Because Cruz’s off-campus online post touches and concerns the 
school community, it would fall within the school’s jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the post interferes with the rights of other students 
and faculty to be let alone at school by instilling fear, and would 
therefore be subject to school punishment at the discretion of 
school administrators. 
In contrast, consider a Parkland shooting survivor’s 
hypothetical Facebook post encouraging classmates to walk out of 
class in support of gun reform under this Note’s proposed standard. 
Suppose her post said “Walk out of class with me tomorrow to 
demand gun reform and make our schools safer places to learn 
#NationalSchoolWalkOut #MarchForOurLives #NeverAgain.” 
Both the nature and the subject of her post are political, and as it 
encourages peer political action at school, it is targeted at her 
classmates. Assuming she has standard privacy settings on her 
Facebook page, only those she has allowed to be her Facebook 
“friends” can see her post.422  Many of these “friends” are likely 
her classmates. Taking these factors together, this post touches and 
concerns the school community, placing it within the school’s 
jurisdiction, as if it had been said on campus itself. The post is 
targeted at the student’s classmates generally but identifies no 
individuals and is in no way disparaging to her classmates. The 
school would therefore not be able to find that this post interfered 
with the rights of any other students or faculty to be let alone, and 
 
422 See Staci D. Kramer, I Tested Facebook's Default Privacy Settings. They're Worse 
than Zuckerberg Says., SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Apr. 16, 2018, 1:13 PM), 
https://www.smh.com.au/business/companies/i-tested-facebooks-default-privacy-
settings-theyre-worse-than-zuckerberg-says-20180414-p4z9m6.html [https://perma.cc
/VTL2-34NQ]; Larry Magid, Facebook Changes New User Default Privacy Setting to 
Friends Only--Adds Privacy Checkup, FORBES (May 22, 2014, 9:00 
AM),  https://www.forbes.com/sites/larrymagid/2014/05/22/facebook-changes-default-
privacy-setting-for-new-users/#61ba7b9459ac [https://perma.cc/T5SC-5SFN]. 
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accordingly, the school could not punish this student for her off-
campus online speech.423 
The posts at issue in the Parkland example are perhaps more 
clear than much of what schools generally encounter. Still, this 
standard would hopefully lead to more consistent outcomes than 
the current use of Tinker in cases of First Amendment issues 
arising from school punishment of off-campus online student 
speech. For example, if applied to the B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. 
Dist. case that is pending in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,424 
the outcome would be more predictable than speculating as to what 
a court may find to cause a substantial disruption of a school 
environment.425 Mahanoy originated when a high school student, 
B.L., was removed from the junior varsity cheerleading squad for 
an image she sent to her friends via the social media application 
Snapchat426 on the weekend,427 which depicted herself and a friend 
brandishing their middle fingers at a convenience store.428 Text 
that was superimposed on the photo read “fuck school fuck softball 
fuck cheer fuck everything,”429 in contravention of a school rule 
that forbids cheerleaders from posting “negative information” 
about cheerleading on the internet. B.L. now challenges this school 
rule under the First Amendment,430 and this Note now applies the 
proposed standard to her speech. 
The nature of B.L.’s post is not immediately obvious. It is 
neither threatening nor violent. It is not political, and does not 
appear to by satirical. If anything, it is meant to be funny, or at 
 
423 Though the post might be disruptive of the school environment by encouraging the 
speaker’s classmates to join her in walking out of class, substantial disruption is not a 
factor in the standard this Note proposes. 
424 B.L. v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., ACLU OF PA., https://www.aclupa.org/our-
work/legal/legaldocket/bl-v-mahanoy-area-sch-dist [https://perma.cc/KH3X-AKMU] 
(last visited Nov. 6, 2018). 
425 As is required under the current Tinker standard. See discussion supra Part II. 
426 The ACLU-PA explains, “Snapchat is a popular social media smartphone app that 
allows users to post images that are accessible on the platform only for short periods of 
time—ranging from one second to 24 hours—and are self-deleting.” ACLU OF PA., supra 
note 424; see also Graber, supra note 6, for further explanation of Snapchat. 
427 ACLU OF PA., supra note 424. 
428 Id. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. 
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least an expression of teenage angst to which her friends, the 
recipients of the post, would surely relate. The subject of the post 
is clearly the speaker’s school community, as she expresses 
exasperation with not only the school itself, but also two athletic 
teams that presumably represent the school. Her audience was 
limited to her Snapchat “friends,” the majority of which are likely 
her classmates.431  The combination of these factors indicates this 
off-campus online post touches and concerns the school 
community, and reasonably places it under the schools purview. 
However, it does not seem that this post interferes with the rights 
of other students to be let alone. The speaker names neither 
classmates nor teammates, and includes no details that would lead 
someone to interpret this post as threatening. One might argue that 
the post interferes with the rights of the school, the softball team, 
or the cheerleading squad to be left alone as entities, but to allow 
this argument to prevail would be to swallow the rule and allow for 
the suppression of many teenage opinions that rage against 
authority or an establishment. B.L.’s speech might be distasteful, 
and she may have violated a school rule by posting “negative 
information” about cheerleading online,432 but as her post did not 
interfere with the rights of others to be let alone, the school should 
not be able to punish her for this off-campus online speech. 
Because students posting online are not necessarily posting at 
school, their posts should not automatically be punishable by 
school authorities. However, there are off-campus online posts that 
are relevant to the school, and therefore need to be addressed by 
school officials. Though the requirement that the post touch and 
concern a member of the school community may seem too broad, 
the standard intends largely to cover those posts that purposely 
target other students or teachers at the school.433 This proposed 
standard does not at all attempt to stifle general communications 
between students—schools exist to guide students through certain 
 
431 Id. 
432 Id. 
433 See generally Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 573–76 (4th Cir. 
2011) (discussing the nexus of the speech to the school, that the family of the victim 
understood the attack to be in a school context, and that the school had an interest in 
preventing “copy-cat” behavior). 
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prescribed activities, and “among those activities is personal 
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an 
inevitable part of the process of attending school; it is also an 
important part of the educational process.”434 Instead, this 
proposed standard attempts to strike a reasonable, predictably-
applied balance between a student’s First Amendment rights 
against the need for a school to maintain order in its halls. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tinker standard was crafted in an era before the internet 
and social media revolutionized human interaction and 
communication. Though this standard remains good law as applied 
to in-school speech, it does not account for the realities of our 
interconnected world, and its application to off-campus online 
student speech therefore leads to unpredictable outcomes that serve 
neither students nor educators well.435 Though the Supreme Court 
has yet to address this issue,436 “[l]egal solutions need to be 
implemented sooner rather than later. The longer we wait, the 
harder it will be to transform conduct, attitudes, and behavior” on 
the subject.437 
Currently, a school can punish an off-campus online student 
post if it is reasonably forecast to cause or actually does cause a 
substantial disruption of the school environment.438 Instead, a 
school should be able to punish only those off-campus online 
student posts that (1) touch and concern the school community, 
and (2) interfere with the rights of other students and faculty to be 
secure and let alone. This proposed standard balances the need of a 
school to regulate off-campus online student speech that is truly of 
its concern, with the integrity of a student’s right to express herself 
and make her voice heard. The yet uncharted waters of digital 
 
434 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969). 
435 See discussion supra Sections II.C, III.B. 
436 See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
437 CITRON, supra note 38, at 28. 
438 See supra Sections II.A–II.C. 
2019] THE TROUBLE WITH TINKER 427 
 
citizenship439 are tempestuous, but given the proper guidelines, 
students and educators can navigate them safely together. 
 
 
439 CITRON, supra note 38, at 194. “The Internet holds great promise for digital 
citizenship, by which I mean the various ways online activities deepen civic engagement, 
political and cultural participation, and public conversation.” Id. (emphasis in original).  
